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Monterey, California



THESIS

**THE UNITED STATES ARMY IN EUROPE:
DESIGNING A NEW FORCE STRUCTURE
FOR A NEW ERA**

by

Aaron E. Kalloch

June 2000

Thesis Advisor:
Second Reader:

David Yost
Bert Patenaude

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**The United States Army in Europe:
Designing a New Force Structure For a New Era**

Aaron E. Kalloch
Captain, United States Army
B.S., United States Military Academy, 1990

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

from the

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ABSTRACT

The current structure of the United States Army in Europe (USAREUR) reflects the drawdown of the force after the end of the Cold War. It consists almost exclusively of heavy forces that are difficult to deploy and sustain, but provide excellent tactical mobility and firepower. The vast changes in the international security environment and the increasing advances in information technology since the early 1990s have invalidated many of the planning factors and assumptions that were used to construct the current force in 1990-1992. This thesis argues that USAREUR needs to be restructured with a mixture of heavy, medium, and light combat forces. This structure would allow USAREUR to accomplish any limited mission across the entire conflict spectrum in its area of responsibility, either with NATO allies or unilaterally, without reinforcement from forces stationed in the United States.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

| | |
|-------|---|
| AAN | Army After Next |
| ACE | Allied Command Europe |
| ACR | Armored Cavalry Regiment |
| AOR | Area of Responsibility |
| ARNG | Army National Guard |
| AWE | Advanced Warfighting Exercise |
| BAT | Brilliant Anti-Tank |
| BUR | Bottom-Up Review |
| CFE | Conventional Forces Europe |
| CINC | Commander-in-Chief |
| CMTC | Combat Maneuver Training Center |
| DOD | Department of Defense |
| ESDI | European Security and Defense Identity |
| EU | European Union |
| EXFOR | Experimental Force |
| GDP | General Defense Plan |
| GLCM | Ground-Launched Cruise Missile |
| HEMTT | Heavy Expanded-Mobility Tactical Truck |
| HMMWV | High-Mobility, Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle |
| IFOR | Implementation Force |
| IRF | Immediate Reaction Force |
| JROC | Joint Requirements Oversight Council |
| KFOR | Kosovo Force |
| KLA | Kosovo Liberation Army |
| MLRS | Multiple-Launch Rocket System |
| MRC | Major Regional Contingency |
| MTR | Military Technical Revolution |
| NATO | North Atlantic Treaty Organization |

| | |
|----------|---|
| NBC | Nuclear, Biological, Chemical |
| NEO | Noncombatant Evacuation Operation |
| NSC | National Security Council |
| NTC | National Training Center |
| POMCUS | Prepositioned Overseas Materiel Configured as Unit Sets |
| OOTW | Operations Other Than War |
| OPTEMPO | Operations Tempo |
| OSCE | Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe |
| OSD | Office of the Secretary of Defense |
| ROAD | Reorganization Objective Army Division |
| RMA | Revolution in Military Affairs |
| SACEUR | Supreme Allied Commander Europe |
| SETAF | Southern European Task Force |
| SFOR | Stabilization Force |
| UNPREDEP | United Nations Preventive Deployment Force |
| UNPROFOR | United Nations Protection Force |
| USAR | United States Army Reserve |
| USAREUR | United States Army Europe |
| USEUCOM | United States European Command |
| WMD | Weapons of Mass Destruction |

I. INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this thesis is to examine how the United States Army in Europe (USAREUR) could change its force structure to meet the demands of the future international security environment and to adapt to the rapid improvements in military technology. New operating procedures are continually being enacted to incorporate new technology while recent conflicts have demonstrated that the current force structure for USAREUR may be inadequate for the future.

A. THE TASK FORCE HAWK DEBACLE

On 24 March 1999, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) began Operation Allied Force against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. As soon as the air strikes began, Slobodan Milosevic ordered his Army and paramilitary forces in Kosovo to intensify their efforts to destroy the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and to conduct an ethnic cleansing campaign against the Kosovar Albanians. NATO political leaders had ruled out sending ground forces into Kosovo to stop the ethnic cleansing because they feared a lack of domestic support. Instead a limited air campaign was approved. It was hoped that a few days of bombing critical infrastructure targets throughout Serbia would persuade Milosevic to call off his campaign in Kosovo and accept the Rambouillet Accords. NATO jets bombed from an altitude of three miles, in order to limit pilot losses.

General Wesley Clark, dual-hatted as Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) and Commander in Chief of United States European Command (CINCEUR), warned the United States and other NATO governments that the jets could not reliably

destroy troops and tanks on the ground. In trying to come up with a solution given the political constraints against the use of ground forces, General Clark requested the deployment of Army AH-64 Apache attack helicopters to the Balkans to attack Serb ground forces. On 3 April, after a number of days of intense discussion among the top leaders in the Pentagon, President Clinton authorized the deployment of the Apaches to the Balkans. General Clark immediately ordered United States Army Europe (USAREUR) Headquarters to deploy an attack aviation task force to the Balkans and prepare to engage Serbian ground forces in Kosovo as part of Operation Allied Force. To comply with the request, USAREUR assembled Task Force Hawk.

Pentagon officials, including Secretary of the Army Luis Caldera, expected that the Apaches would arrive within ten days, and then be given permission to conduct combat missions. However, it took over three weeks for the 24 Apache Helicopters and the ponderous 6,200-man contingent of support troops, ground defense forces, and Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) batteries of Task Force Hawk to deploy a few hundred kilometers from their bases in Germany.¹ Once there, it took another two weeks to train the helicopter crews to fly at night with night vision goggles and in high altitude conditions. During the two weeks of flight training, two of the Apaches crashed and two pilots were killed. Ironically, though the Apaches never conducted a flight into Kosovo, these deaths were the only American aircrew losses associated with Operation Allied Force.

¹ Priest, Dana, "How the Fear of Losses Kept Super-Copters From Kosovo Action," *International Herald Tribune*, 30 December 1999, p. 2.

The Apache helicopter was not designed to operate independently, but rather in conjunction with ground forces at the division and corps level. Since an independent Apache attack operation was not a traditional mission defined in Army doctrine, it was never exercised in training. Coordinating rotary-wing aircraft operations into the Air Tasking Order proved difficult as the tactics, techniques, and procedures for integrating the helicopters, unmanned aerial vehicles, radars, and rocket artillery had to be developed and refined.²

The glacial pace of the deployment and the problems upon arrival demonstrated many of the deficiencies in the planning, training, and force structure within USAREUR. In the original plans, the Apaches were to be sent to Camp Able Sentry (an American base for the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force) in Macedonia; but the Macedonian government, faced with a crushing refugee problem, refused their entry. The deployment then shifted to Albania, where the government accepted them. The change in deployment site to Albania necessitated the deployment of additional force protection assets and infrastructure support. Consequently, the materiel required to deploy this force grew by a factor of three. Exacerbating the dramatic increase in the lift requirement was the fact that Task Force Hawk was in competition with the humanitarian Joint Task Force Shining Hope for scarce airbase resources in Tirana, Albania. The small airport became a bottleneck while the Air Force Engineers desperately worked to expand capacity. The area around the runway became a muddy mess, as tracked and wheeled vehicles ripped up the rain-saturated ground. The ground conditions caused further

² Department of Defense, *Report to Congress: Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action Report*, 31 January 2000, p. 77.

delays because concrete slabs had to be poured and set to serve as landing pads for the Apaches. In retrospect, the entire Task Force could have arrived in Albania much faster, while freeing up drastically needed C-17 sorties, had it deployed by train from Germany to Brindisi, Italy, ferried across the Adriatic, and convoyed to Tirana.³

The fact that the 11th Aviation Regiment could man only 33 out of its 48 Apache helicopters, while none of its crews was qualified to fly at night with night vision goggles and none of its platoon leaders had achieved pilot in command status, demonstrates how budget cutbacks have hurt the manning and training of units within USAREUR and throughout the Army as a whole.⁴ USAREUR did not even have the correct type of forces to deal with this limited mission. Lacking rapidly deployable light forces, USAREUR requested assistance and received a reinforced infantry battalion from the 82nd Airborne Division to assist with force protection while it deployed its heavy forces which required additional logistics and support personnel to sustain operations.

Task Force Hawk was nonetheless a success from some perspectives. Its presence helped to stabilize Albania and thereby prevented a government collapse. A wider war was possibly prevented because Task Force Hawk's presence in the capital allowed the small Albanian Army to deploy to the border with Kosovo to deter raids against KLA strongholds inside Albania. However, for the U.S. Army, especially in terms of public opinion, Task Force Hawk was a huge embarrassment. The Task Force

³ Department of Defense, *Report to Congress: Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action Report*, 31 January 2000, pp. 42-43.

⁴ Naylor, Sean D., "They Weren't Ready: General Says Task Force Hawk Aviators Unprepared for Challenges in Kosovo," *Army Times*, 5 July 1999, p. 8.

Hawk debacle helps to explain why a reassessment of USAREUR's force structure is timely.

B. THESIS OVERVIEW

The current structure of USAREUR was developed in the early 1990s to meet the demands of that uncertain time. With the Cold War over and the Soviet Union dissolved, the American public wanted a peace dividend and Congress pushed for massive reductions in forces stationed in Europe. However, the United States still needed visible forces stationed in Europe to maintain its leadership of NATO, allay European fears of a reunited Germany, and deter interstate wars in the power vacuum of Eastern Europe. The solution implemented was a force structure of 64,000 soldiers centered around an armored corps of two divisions plus combat support and combat service support brigades. The corps is dual-based because a brigade combat team from each division is stationed at Fort Riley, Kansas, and, when alerted, would fly to Germany and fall in on prepositioned equipment.

The question this thesis attempts to answer is whether this structure will enable the United States to accomplish its security objectives in Europe, including its NATO commitments, over the next two decades until the fielding of the Army After Next, around 2020. The thesis examines the hypothesis that USAREUR needs to change its force structure from a predominantly armored force to a mixed force of armor, strike, and light units. This mixed configuration, without an increase in the number of troops, would maintain visibility, deter adversaries, and maintain U.S. leadership of NATO. The new structure would provide forces that are more deployable and capable of conducting operations across the entire spectrum of conflict. In addition, the proposed structure

would enhance American military capability through increased joint activities and improved interoperability with other NATO forces.

The subject of this thesis is important because a secure and stable Europe remains vital to American interests, and United States military forces stationed in Europe represent America's commitment to the region. There has not been a serious look at restructuring U.S. military forces in Europe since the 1990-1992 time frame, even though many of the assumptions and planning factors used to create the current structure are no longer valid. Deployments to the Balkans and Africa have yielded many lessons, and the development of information technology continues to accelerate, while the threat of a conventional attack against Western Europe has all but disappeared. It is logical that changes in the security environment lead to changes in force structure.

This thesis is based on certain assumptions about the future of United States security strategy in Europe. In light of American interests in Europe, the United States will choose to remain engaged in European affairs, but budget constraints will prevent a large increase in stationed forces. Thus recommendations for a future force will not deviate by more than 20 percent on either side of the current force. In light of the balanced budget amendment, this thesis assumes that there will be no major increase in defense spending to pay for structural changes.

C. METHODOLOGY

This thesis uses the comparative method to analyze various factors in the force structure debate. Analyses are conducted on the future security environment in the U.S. European Command's Area of Responsibility (AOR), the impact of information age technology on military affairs, and the role of domestic and bureaucratic politics in

constraining radical change to military organizations. The results of these analyses are integrated in an attempt to define an optimal solution.

D. ORGANIZATION

Following this introduction, Chapter II presents a brief history of USAREUR and the European security environment, with particular attention to the time period from 1989 through 1999. In addition the chapter examines the current USAREUR force structure. Chapter III analyzes the current and future security environment throughout the USEUCOM AOR and identifies areas where conflict could take place that might require USAREUR forces. Chapter IV analyzes the impact of information age technology on future warfare and force structure and considers the impact of domestic and bureaucratic politics in force structure decisions. Chapter V integrates the findings in the previous chapters, makes recommendations on force structure, and provides a summary of the conclusions.

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II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF USAREUR

A. INTRODUCTION

When conducting an analysis of potential changes in a military force structure, it is important to understand the history of that force in order to determine its reason for being and the origins of the current structure. A review of the history of the United States Army in Europe (USAREUR) is imperative.

After being victorious in World War II, USAREUR was reduced in size to a relatively small constabulary force to maintain law and order in the U.S. occupation sectors in Germany and Austria. With the onset of the Cold War, USAREUR was increased in size and given the mission to deter, and if that failed, defeat an attack by Soviet and Soviet-allied forces into Western Europe. Seen as the bulwark of NATO, USAREUR was the main focus of the U.S. Army during most of the Cold War, even during the Korean and Vietnam conflicts. With the end of the Cold War, USAREUR reduced its force presence. Its mission has evolved from a focus on main defense to expeditionary warfare, with operations in the Persian Gulf, the Balkans, and Africa.

B. 1945-1949: DEMOBILIZATION, OCCUPATION, AND THE BEGINNINGS OF THE COLD WAR

When Germany surrendered on 8 May 1945, the war in Europe ended. The U.S. Army immediately set up a military government and constabulary force to rule its occupation zones in devastated Germany and Austria, including the U.S. sectors of Berlin and Vienna. The constabulary troops maintained law and order and worked hard to assist the Germans and Austrians in maintaining basic services and providing food to sustain

the population. As the number of U.S. Army soldiers dwindled because of demobilization, the Germans received more authority in running their own affairs at the local level.

In the summer of 1945 there were four million soldiers and airmen in the U.S. Army serving in Europe. Demobilization of these men and units was rapid. By the end of 1945, this number was cut in half, and by the summer of 1947 all draftees were discharged and draft calls stopped. By early 1949, there were slightly less than 100,000 American soldiers in Europe; and they were organized into one infantry division, a few constabulary regiments, and support troops.

By 1948, the Cold War had clearly begun. The key developments in Europe included the Soviet-orchestrated coup d'état in Czechoslovakia and the Soviet blockade of Berlin. The Western states responded by organizing to defend themselves against an increasingly aggressive Soviet Union and its immense Army in occupied Eastern Europe. On 4 April 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty for collective defense was signed. On 21 September 1949, the U.S. Army ended military government in Germany as the Federal Republic of Germany was recognized. The occupation of Austria lasted until 1955, when the Austrian State Treaty was signed.

Even after signing the North Atlantic Treaty, the United States did not increase its troop commitment to Europe, and instead relied upon its monopoly on atomic weapons to guarantee its security as well as that of its allies. At the end of 1949, USAREUR had only about 100,000 troops consisting of only one infantry division and a number of constabulary regiments. The Soviets and their client states reportedly had as many as 175

divisions in Eastern Europe.⁵ However, on 14 July 1949 the Soviets exploded their own atomic device, ending the United States monopoly and forcing a reappraisal of U.S. strategy and commitments in Europe.⁶

C. 1950-1989: THE COLD WAR

Even with the increased tension in Europe, the event that changed USAREUR's course was the outbreak of the Korean War. This event "put the 'O' in NATO" by persuading the allies to organize an integrated military command structure in peacetime and by establishing the presumption of a large, long-term U.S. military presence in Europe.⁷ This blatant aggression by the monolithic communist block was seen as a possible attempt to divert the attention of the United States to Asia while the real attack would be launched against Western Europe. Under the new containment strategy outlined in NSC-68, the United States began a major build-up of military forces.

Even though a war was being fought in Korea, the major American build-up took place in Europe. USAREUR was increased from one division to five divisions. Through the Mutual Defense Assistance Program, the United States also helped strengthen the NATO ground, air, and naval forces. During this same period NATO adopted a strategy which contemplated defending West Germany as far east of the Rhine as possible. In

⁵ Keylor, William R., *The Twentieth Century World: An International History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 275.

⁶ Keylor, William R., *The Twentieth Century World: An International History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 275.

⁷ Yost, David S., *NATO Transformed: The Alliance's New Roles in International Security* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1998), p. 29.

1954 the United States, the United Kingdom, and France agreed that the Federal Republic of Germany could establish military forces to assist in its own defense.

After the death of Stalin, in 1953, and the end of the Korean War, tensions in Europe subsided. The United States maintained a large number of forces in Europe, but shifted its emphasis from deploying additional forces to developing infrastructure – the construction of roads, airfields, bases, housing, depots, and communications systems to support a U.S. military presence for the long term.

From this point until the end of the Cold War, USAREUR remained remarkably constant in both its size and internal configuration. During the Cold War the average size of USAREUR was about 225,000 soldiers. Almost all of them were stationed in Germany to deter and, if necessary, defend against a Soviet/Warsaw Pact attack. Throughout the rest of the 1950s, the U.S. force presence and NATO developed in close cooperation. However, because of its dominant military contribution to the alliance, the United States emerged as NATO's unquestioned leader, a role that gave it considerable influence over alliance policy and strategy.⁸

In 1961, the incoming Kennedy administration switched strategies from “massive retaliation” to “flexible response.” The new strategy called for NATO to preserve its strong nuclear force while developing stronger conventional forces. With the Berlin Crisis in 1961, President Kennedy dispatched 40,000 troops to Europe and mobilized

⁸ Kugler, Richard L., *The Future U.S. Military Presence in Europe: Forces and Requirements for the Post-Cold War Era* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1992), pp. 18-19.

120,000 reservists in the United States. By late 1963, NATO troops in Europe for the first time actually outnumbered those of the Warsaw Pact.⁹

By the end of 1966, the war in Vietnam was starting to have a major impact on USAREUR. Because President Johnson refused to call up the Reserves, the Army never had enough soldiers to support the war in Vietnam without drawing on USAREUR for replacements. In the late 1960s, USAREUR, in effect, became a staging area for troops before they went to Vietnam. For the first time since 1950, many units in USAREUR were greatly undermanned. Personnel rotated through units in USAREUR so fast that there was little unit cohesion; the rapid rotations resulted in poor morale, discipline, and combat readiness. From 1963 to 1969, the personnel strength of USEUCOM dropped by 125,000 to 285,000.¹⁰ In the early 1970s, USAREUR, once the pride of the Army, was a wreck.

As the United States withdrew from Vietnam in 1973-75, leaders in the U.S. Army focused their attention on Europe. They found the strategic environment had altered over the previous decade. After Khrushchev's failures in Berlin and the Cuban missile crisis, the new Soviet Premier, Leonid Brezhnev, began a massive arms build-up. By the mid-1970s, the Soviets were superior to NATO in both conventional and nuclear forces in Europe, and the gap was widening.

⁹ Weigley, Russell, *History of the United States Army*, enlarged edition (Bloomington Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1984), p. 527.

¹⁰ Binder, L. James, *Lemnitzer: A Soldier for His Time* (Washington D.C.: Brassey's, 1997), pp. 323-324.

NATO allies were unwilling to expand their conventional forces to meet the new Soviet challenge. Instead, the United States increasingly emphasized its traditional role of providing outside reinforcement to Europe in a crisis. The Army planned to deploy ten divisions from the United States in only ten days. These units were to fall in on POMCUS (Prepositioned Overseas Materiel Configured as Unit Sets) equipment and move to prepared defensive positions at the front according to the General Defense Plan (GDP). Special units, including two forward brigades, were created to manage the large influx of troops and to maintain the equipment.¹¹ To practice the deployment aspects of this plan and to train units on the German terrain, USAREUR conducted annual REFORGER (Return of Forces to Germany) exercises, in which two to three divisions deployed from the United States. The last REFORGER exercise conducted with deploying troops took place in 1991, when the 10th Mountain Division was sent to Germany. Since then, REFORGER exercises have been conducted only through computer simulations.

The Carter-Reagan defense build-up of the late 1970s to mid-1980s brought USAREUR back to being the pride of the Army. The increased defense budget provided more money for training, maintenance, quality of life, and procurement of a new generation of weapon systems. In turn, the performance of USAREUR rose dramatically throughout the 1980s. The deployment of the intermediate-range nuclear Pershing II ballistic missiles and ground launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) to counter the Soviet SS-

¹¹ Kugler, Richard L., *The Future US Military Presence in Europe: Forces and Requirements for the Post-Cold War Era* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1992), pp. 18-19.

20s demonstrated the new resolve of the United States and its NATO allies in the defense of Western Europe.

In 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev became the leader of the Soviet Union. He recognized that two decades of military expansion had stretched the USSR's economy to the breaking point. What was needed was "breathing space" from international competition in order to recuperate internally before returning to the contest with capitalism. Within a few years Gorbachev's policies of perestroika and glasnost allowed the weakest links in the Soviet Empire, the Soviet-allied Communist regimes in Eastern Europe, to collapse in 1989.

After the signing of the INF (Intermediate Nuclear Forces) Treaty in 1987, the United States began to slowly withdraw units, starting with the Pershing missile batteries and their support forces. When the Berlin Wall came down in November 1989, USAREUR had 213,000 soldiers and 17 combat brigades stationed in Europe. USAREUR's primary combat units were the V and VII Corps that defended the most likely invasion routes to the west through the Fulda and Meinengen Gaps in Germany. An infantry brigade combat team defended West Berlin while in Southern Europe an infantry task force and nuclear artillery helped defend Northern Italy against a possible attack from Hungary through Slovenia, and U.S. nuclear artillery units defended northern Greece and Turkey. In addition, USAREUR units handled most of NATO's theater-level command, control, communications, and intelligence functions.

D. THE 1990S: THE GULF WAR, DRAWDOWN, AND EXPEDITIONS TO THE BALKANS

In March 1990, USAREUR forces pulled back from their positions along the inter-German and Czechoslovak borders and some units began to prepare for deactivation. Approximately one year after the fall of the Berlin Wall, VII Corps was ordered to Southwest Asia to be the main force in the ground attack for Operation Desert Storm. Many lessons were learned from the deployment. For USAREUR, the most important was the staggering amount of transport and logistics required to deploy and maintain a large armored force far from its garrison in an austere environment.

It took nearly three months to deploy the Corps to Saudi Arabia, and it required most of the remaining forces in Germany to assist them to get there. Because of the possible terrorist threat, all bases and housing areas had to be patrolled. Units waiting for deployment moved to Grafenwöhr and Hohenfels, the primary training areas in Germany, to conduct final training. Since their equipment was heading for the ports, remaining units from V Corps provided equipment and personnel to assist in the training. In addition, mobilized Individual Ready Reservists were also sent to these training areas and required support. Additional support was also needed for convoy escorts, rail yard details, and port details.

In focusing during the Cold War almost completely on campaigning in Central Europe, the Army put itself in a bind. Its doctrine and equipment were designed to operate in the European environment where there are excellent ports and staging facilities, large numbers of host nation support personnel, and stockpiles of supplies necessary for war. At first, problems resulted because USAREUR lacked procedures and

training for rapid movement out of Europe; troops and equipment had always been coming to Europe instead. The Arabian Desert was an austere environment with limited host nation support and facilities. This meant that everything needed for war would have to be brought to Saudi Arabia by the U.S. military. This fact alone nearly doubled the initial shipping estimate and caused delays in getting the entire Corps deployed.

In November 1990, while VII Corps was starting its deployment to Saudi Arabia, the member nations of NATO and the Warsaw Pact signed the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, known as the CFE Treaty. The treaty placed limits on five major types of combat equipment (main battle tanks, artillery, armored combat vehicles, attack helicopters and combat aircraft), but the Warsaw Pact states had to make most of the reductions. In July 1991, the Warsaw Pact disbanded; and in December 1991 the Soviet Union disbanded into a loose organization called the Commonwealth of Independent States. In spite of these collapses, the CFE Treaty remains in force and continues to be amended through negotiations under the auspices of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). ¹²

By the summer of 1992 USAREUR was in the process of being reduced to a size of 92,000. After its triumphant performance in the Gulf War, VII Corps returned to Germany and was deactivated along with the forward headquarters and reception brigades of the 1st Infantry Division and 2nd Armored Division, all Army nuclear artillery, and the Berlin Brigade. USAREUR continued to provide theater-level logistics, intelligence, and communications support through the 21st Theater Army Area Command,

¹² Yost, David S., *NATO Transformed: The Alliance's New Roles in International Security* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1998), p. 395.

66th Military Intelligence Group, and the 5th Signal Command, though at a reduced level. Its combat capability consisted of V Corps and the reinforced battalion-sized Southern European Task Force (SETAF). V Corps had two full divisions and an Armored Cavalry regiment plus Combat Support (CS) and Combat Service Support (CSS) Brigades.

With the dissolution of the Soviet Union and increasing pressure to further reduce the defense budget, the new Clinton Administration ordered further cuts to U.S. forces in Europe. V Corps withdrew its Armored Cavalry Regiment and each division withdrew a Brigade Combat Team. USAREUR maintains three Brigade Combat Teams' worth of POMCUS equipment, two in Germany and one in Italy. Two brigades at Fort Riley, Kansas, are earmarked to deploy to Europe and use this equipment on order. This reduced USAREUR to its current level of four combat brigades and 64,000 personnel, within a total U.S. force presence in Europe of approximately 100,000.

In light of impending force reductions, NATO began organizing multinational land formations to achieve maximum efficiencies from remaining forces,¹ preserve higher-level command structures for smaller nations, and maximize residual capabilities, especially for smaller nations.¹³ USAREUR is involved in three of these formations, and this must be taken into account when making force structure changes. The Allied Command Europe (ACE) Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) was created in 1991 to be the NATO contingency force. The United States agreed to provide the 1st Armored Division and the 12th Aviation Brigade from USAREUR to this force. In 1993, the U.S.-German

¹³Young, Thomas-Durell, *Multinational Land Formations and NATO: Reforming Practices and Structures* (Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1997), p.2.

Corps was created. This arrangement is to be activated only for main defense missions. For such missions the 1st Armored Division will be transferred to the German II Corps while the 5th Panzer Division will be assigned to U.S. V Corps. Integration will be accomplished through small liaison teams. The ACE Immediate Reaction Force (IRF) has replaced the old ACE Mobile Force. The United States is committed to providing an airborne battalion to this force.

While USAREUR was focusing on the withdrawal of major portions of its forces in Europe, conflict broke out in Yugoslavia. The Bush Administration did not want to get involved, but some of the Europeans accepted the challenge. The United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), comprised primarily of Europeans led by France and Britain, deployed to Bosnia to protect the delivery of humanitarian aid and prevent the spread of the conflict.

The Clinton administration was at odds with the Europeans over NATO's involvement in Bosnia and the role of UNPROFOR, and was unwilling to deploy U.S. troops into the conflict. Instead President Clinton deployed a battalion of USAREUR troops to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) as the lead element of the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) to protect and stabilize Macedonia and thereby prevent a bigger crisis in the Balkans.

In the summer of 1995 it became apparent that UNPROFOR might have to be withdrawn. Under NATO Plan 40-104, the United States had agreed to provide as many as 20,000 troops to secure the withdrawal of UNPROFOR. Once the Clinton administration realized the political impact of this plan, it took a series of steps –

including Operation Deliberate Force in August-September 1995 – that led to the Dayton Peace Accords.

In December 1995, USAREUR soldiers, as part of the ARRC, began to move to a staging base in Hungary for deployment to Bosnia as part of the Dayton Implementation Force (IFOR). The deployment of IFOR fared well, but it took a long time to deploy and set up the CS and CSS units, including their supplies and equipment, in Hungary. Due to the logistical demands of the combat forces, these units had to arrive first. The Balkans lacked the necessary infrastructure to supply these forces. The only light element of USAREUR, the airborne battalion that is assigned to the Southern European Task Force (SETAF), landed at Tuzla Air Base in Bosnia, established a base of operations, and began to patrol the area well before the heavy units of the 1st Armored Division began to arrive.

IFOR was successful in maintaining the peace between the various groups in Bosnia, but the situation remained unstable. After one year in Bosnia, in December 1996, the mandate for IFOR came to an end. A continuation of the NATO presence was warranted to allow for time to bring the political factions together, rebuild the economic structure, and establish an international police force. So the Stabilization Force (SFOR) replaced IFOR in December 1996. In October 1997, combat units garrisoned in the United States took charge of Multinational Division North; and they continue in this mission to this day, while the USAREUR Commander has remained in charge of the entire SFOR effort. At the establishment of IFOR in December 1995, 20,000 American soldiers deployed to Bosnia. There are plans now to reduce the number to 4,500 by the summer of 2000.

After the conclusion of Operation Allied Force in June 1999, NATO ground forces deployed to Kosovo as part of KFOR (Kosovo Force). The United States, assigned the southeastern sector of Kosovo, deployed approximately 6,000 soldiers to patrol the area. Reprisals by Kosovar Albanians against Serbs continue despite the American military presence. Elements of the KLA recently began to launch attacks from the American sector into ethnic Albanian-dominated Presevo Valley in adjacent Serbia. To counter this move USAREUR is sending its reconnaissance company from V Corps to patrol the border area. The stabilization of Kosovo, even more than Bosnia, will require a long-term commitment of NATO forces, and this fact needs to be considered in any design for force structure change.

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III. THE FUTURE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

A. INTRODUCTION

The current and future security challenges for USAREUR will not be in Central Europe, where it is garrisoned. Its missions will be out on the perimeter of an increasingly eastward expanding NATO alliance, or on the fringes of USEUCOM's area of responsibility. These challenges will require a mixture of highly trained forces that are equipped for either tactical or rapid strategic movement. USAREUR's current structure of nearly all armor and mechanized units is too heavy for the rapid strategic movement necessary to respond effectively in crisis situations.

B. RUSSIA, STILL THE KEY ACTOR

The NATO relationship with Russia will continue to be the key element in the future of European security. When the analysis of the future structure of USAREUR was completed in 1992, the Soviet Union had collapsed, but the Russian Army was still powerful and had to be reckoned with. Today, Russian conventional forces are a mere shadow of the Soviet Armed Forces of a little more than a decade ago.

The withdrawal of Russian forces from the former Warsaw Pact countries and from some of the other former Soviet republics means there is no longer a significant conventional threat to Central or Western Europe. The size, capability, and quality of Russian conventional forces continue to decline at a staggering rate. Currently Russia has approximately 1.2 million men in its armed forces. However, in view of the most recent economic and financial crisis Russia will be able to afford armed forces of only

550,000 to 600,000 men; this means cuts of up to half of the forces.¹⁴ Russian military readiness is at the lowest levels since the 1930s. In 1996 fewer than half of Russia's 61 ground force divisions were operational, while the number of combat ready divisions was estimated at between 0 and 8. The lack of money has meant that more than 70 percent of force training exercises have had to be canceled due to a lack of fuel, and not a single division level exercise has been held since 1992.¹⁵

Around 2010 the Russian military will face a crisis of massive bloc obsolescence unless the negative trend in weapons procurement changes. Most of Russia's weapons inventory was built in the 1970s and 1980s, and this equipment will reach the end of its service life in the next decade. Procurement of new equipment has fallen to near zero. The new models of tanks and airplanes coming off the assembly line are almost purely for the export market.¹⁶

The continuing financial crisis has also affected maintenance of the current equipment. There has been little money for spare parts, so units have been cannibalizing part of the force to keep the rest of it operational. As the equipment continues to age, more maintenance will be required to keep it running. This process, if allowed to continue, will lead to a near free-fall decline in weapons inventories over the next decade.

¹⁴ Vogel, Heinrich, et al., *Russia's Perspectives: Critical Factors and Potential Developments up to 2010* (Cologne, Germany: Federal Institute for Russian, East European, and International Studies, 1999), p. 32.

¹⁵ Goldman, Stuart D., *Russian Conventional Armed Forces: On the Verge of Collapse?* (Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 1997), p. 20.

¹⁶ Goldman, Stuart D., *Russian Conventional Armed Forces: On the Verge of Collapse?* (Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 1997), p. 9.

Lack of training and operational equipment, the declining quality of life, and the absence of regular paychecks have sunk Russian military morale to a new low. Most servicemen have second jobs just to get by. The miserable conditions at the enlisted level have led to a high rate of draft evasion and desertion, while junior and mid-grade officers, the future of the Russian military, are leaving in droves. The result of the decline of the Russian military was seen in the absolute failure in the 1994-96 war in Chechnya.¹⁷

In May 1997, in the wake of the first Chechen War, President Yeltsin appointed Marshal Sergeyev as the Minister of Defense. Despite being handicapped by grossly inadequate funding, Sergeyev has managed to lay the foundation for fundamental military reform. He has reduced the number of troops from 1.8 to 1.2 million; reduced, consolidated, and reorganized military services, headquarters, and military districts; gained presidential approval for his blueprint on developing Russian armed forces through 2005; and deployed a regiment of SS-27 TOPOL-M nuclear intercontinental ballistic missiles.¹⁸ These reforms have constituted practical measures requiring relatively little money to accomplish. He has failed to resolve the most important issues, such as troop morale and combat readiness, because of a lack of funds to adequately address the problems.

Phase two of Sergeyev's military reform plan, addressing the years 2001-2005, includes efforts to improve command and control systems; increase operational and

¹⁷ Goldman, Stuart D., *Russian Conventional Armed Forces: On the Verge of Collapse?* (Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 1997), pp. 20-23.

¹⁸ Parchomenko, Walter, "The State of Russia's Armed Forces and Military Reform," *Parameters*, Winter 1999-2000, p. 103.

tactical combat training; improve the quality of life for officers and soldiers; move to a three-branch structure of land, air and space, and sea forces; and lay the foundations for the procurement of a new generation of weapons systems. This plan, however, does not mesh with the available resources. Military spending, in real terms, continues to fall. Although military reform is finally off the ground, there is no money to carry out the far-reaching reforms of Sergeyev's plan.¹⁹

However, on 27 January 2000, Vladimir Putin, then Prime Minister and acting President, announced a 50 percent increase in weapons spending for the year. The defense ministry will receive 62 billion rubles (\$2.15 billion) for arms and modernization for the year.²⁰ Some analysts forecast that Putin will shift Russia away from an emphasis on nuclear weapons in favor of upgrading conventional forces with systems to allow them to fight at night and in all weather in places such as Chechnya. In the short term, high world oil prices may provide enough revenue to accomplish this goal, but continued economic weakness casts doubts on whether the new direction can be sustained over the long term. Although a fifty percent increase sounds significant, it is only a fraction of what the Russian military will need annually for at least a decade to fully modernize the armed forces. In contrast the U.S. Army alone received \$9.3 billion for

¹⁹ Parchomenko, Walter, "The State of Russia's Armed Forces and Military Reform," *Parameters* (Winter 1999-2000), pp. 105-106.

²⁰ Whittel, Giles, "Military Spending to Grow by 50%," *The Times* (London), 28 January 2000. Available [Lexis/Nexis]: NEWS/CURNWS [29 April 2000].

procurement and another \$5.2 billion for research and development in FY 2000 and is requesting more for FY2001.²¹

The resumption of war in Chechnya in 1999 may signal a resurgence of the Russian military or it may lead Russia to further decline. From September 1999 to February 2000, Putin conducted an aggressive campaign against the Chechens. The Russians launched air and artillery attacks to avoid casualties among their own troops and to steadily push the Chechen combatants into the capital of Grozny. The battle in Grozny raged and the city was destroyed by the indiscriminate use of heavy weaponry by the Russians. After two weeks, the Russian Army took control of the city, but a majority of the Chechen combatants escaped and Russian forces sustained thousands of casualties. Since evacuating Grozny, the Chechen combatants have been conducting a guerrilla campaign of raids and ambushes and thereby inflicting casualties upon Russian forces on a daily basis.

Putin's hard line in Chechnya proved popular with Russians and elevated the new Prime Minister to victory in the March 2000 Russian Presidential elections. After his victory, Putin vowed to destroy the Chechen combatants to end the conflict. The Chechens are hoping to draw Russian units into a protracted campaign that increases both the economic costs and Russian casualties, thereby pressuring Moscow to withdraw.²²

²¹ Caldera, Louis, and Eric K. Shinseki, *A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army Fiscal Year 2001* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, February 2000), p. 34.

²² Menon, Rajan and Graham E. Fuller, "Russia's Ruinous Chechen War," *Foreign Affairs* (March/April 2000), p. 41.

Some observers fear that if the fighting in Chechnya becomes protracted and cannot be successfully resolved using conventional means, Russia will not be able to withdraw from it because of domestic political reasons. At that point, the argument holds, either the conflict will drag on, leading to massive political turmoil, or the Russians will be tempted to escalate by using NBC weapons – a decision that could threaten regional stability. Another fear is that a protracted campaign will drain the military of funds necessary for long-term reform and decrease military morale to a point of near collapse of conventional military forces. The collapse of the Russian military could lead to vast internal chaos, with the possibility of a civil war in a nuclear-armed state. However, a Russian victory in Chechnya could lead to a resurgence of the Russian military and of the power of the central government, and to attempts to reclaim the so-called “near abroad.” With the future of Russia uncertain, it is imperative that the United States maintain its military forces in Europe at the current level.

C. POTENTIAL AREAS OF CONTENTION WITH RUSSIA

With its vast reduction in military power and its profound economic problems, Russia has lost its grip over Eastern Europe. The former Warsaw Pact countries and some former Soviet republics are clamoring to get into the NATO alliance. Only Belarus has remained firmly within the Russian orbit. In 1999, Minsk signed a unification treaty with Russia. Eastern European countries desire the protection of the Alliance under Article 5 (the collective defense pledge) as a hedge against a possible resurgent Russia. At the same time, this security will enable these countries to focus on the political and economic reforms needed to be admitted into the European Union (EU). In 1999, the first three former Warsaw Pact countries (Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary)

were admitted into NATO. NATO does not plan to call for new members until 2002 at the earliest; but there is an open door, and it appears that by the end of the next decade as many as eight new members could be admitted to NATO.

Russia does not like the idea of NATO expansion toward its borders. Eastern Europe has traditionally been its sphere of influence. The Russian opposition to NATO action in Kosovo is a prime example of its desire to keep NATO out of Eastern Europe. According to some military analysts, NATO currently has a 3:1 advantage in conventional forces versus Russia. Further expansion in the next decade could bring this advantage to 4:1, if not higher, even with reductions in defense spending by most NATO countries.

Russian relations with the Baltic States are a sensitive matter, and the Russians have repeatedly expressed opposition to the aspirations of these states for NATO membership. Even with its Army in its present state of decline, it is widely agreed, Russia could roll over the geographically exposed and militarily weak Baltic States at will.²³ It appears doubtful that the Russians would exercise this option, knowing the heavy price they would pay in political and economic terms, especially if they can negotiate constitutional rights for ethnic Russian minorities, foreign troop limits, and guaranteed passage to the Kaliningrad Oblast.

A security crisis can be expected in Moldova in the near future. Romania will probably be admitted to NATO in the next decade. Moldova was part of Romania until 1939, when Stalin invaded and took the land to create a western security belt for the

²³Goldman, Stuart D., *Russian Conventional Armed Forces: On the Verge of Collapse?* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 1997), p. 34.

USSR. In the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Moldova declared its independence, and some leading Moldovans advocated a reunion with Romania. However, the Russian-speaking majority on the eastern bank of the Dniester River objected to independence from Russia and, fearing a reunification with Romania, declared its independence from the Romanian-speaking western bank. Conflict broke out between the two sides and hundreds were killed. A frozen cease-fire has preserved the status quo, which entails the virtual independence of the self-declared, but non-recognized, Dniester Republic from Moldova.²⁴ In the self-declared Dniester Republic, 2,500 Russian "peacekeepers," remnants from the Soviet 14th Army Group, have been protecting the ethnic Russians since 1992. In November 1999, Russia announced that it would withdraw these forces by 2002.²⁵ However, since most of these Russian soldiers were born and raised in Transdnistria, they likely will not withdraw to Russia, but simply transfer to a Transdnistrian Army. This transfer could spark a renewal of fighting that might hypothetically lead to a requirement for NATO forces to intervene. Alliance governments would, however, be cautious about undertaking any intervention on the territory of the former Soviet Union; the Allies would probably seek the concurrence and participation of Russia in such a contingency.

Russia strongly opposes Ukraine's admission to NATO and quite possibly would go to war to prevent such a development. Ukraine is a huge factor in assessing future

²⁴ Tkach, Vlada, "Moldova and Transdnistria: Painful Past, Deadlocked Present, Uncertain Future," *European Security*, Vol. 8, No. 2 (Summer 1999), pp. 134-135.

²⁵ Gordon, Michael R., "Russia to Cut Its Military Forces in Georgia," *The New York Times*, 24 November 1999, p. A8.

Russian military capabilities. Ukraine has a large population, a technological and industrial base, and armed forces. If Ukraine was admitted to NATO, it would stand as the major barrier against any future Russian military westward pressure. Conversely, if Ukraine remained in the Russian orbit or was absorbed by a resurgent Russia in the future, Russia would regain some lost power in Eastern European affairs.

Another area of possible Western conflict with Russia is the Caucasus. At an OSCE meeting in Istanbul in November 1999, Russia suffered three major setbacks in its attempt to control the fate of the area. First, Western leaders criticized President Yeltsin over his conduct of the war in Chechnya, and implicitly threatened to delay or stop critical loans to Russia. Second, Russia agreed to reduce its military presence in Georgia, announcing that it will close two out of the four military bases it operates there by 2002.²⁶ The third and most important was an agreement signed by Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey, to build an oil and gas pipeline that would assure Western control over the vast oil and natural gas reserves in the Caspian Basin.²⁷ If built, the financing will primarily come from American oil companies. The route of the pipeline avoids both Iran and Russia and will help draw the Caucasus countries away from them and thereby give the United States and other Western nations greater influence in the region.

²⁶ Gordon, Michael R., "Russia to Cut Its Military Forces in Georgia," *The New York Times*, 24 November 1999, p. A8.

²⁷ Dorsey, James, "Caspian Pipelines Deal a Major Policy Coup for Washington," *The Scotsman*, 19 November 1999. Available [Lexis/Nexis]: NEWS/CURNWS [29 April 2000].

However, the Caucasus region is unstable. Aside from the conflict in neighboring Chechnya, Georgia faces two secessionist movements, in the regions of Abkhazia along the Black Sea and in South Ossetia in the mountains bordering Russia. In Azerbaijan, conflict over the province of Nagorno-Karabakh has been going on for over a decade. The majority ethnic Armenian population in the province desires unification with Armenia. Russia, to keep its influence in the area, supports Armenia and the separatist ethnic Armenian movement in Azerbaijan and also has intervened in Georgia. Russia maintains a significant military presence in Armenia. If the pipeline is built, Western military intervention could be required in some circumstances to ensure the flow of oil and gas, to protect the investments of American companies, and to guarantee the security and prosperity of Turkey, a NATO ally.

D. THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN

The NATO member with the most significant security challenges at present is Turkey. The Turks continue their campaign against Kurdish guerrillas in the southeastern portion of the country. The decades-long campaign, which has drawn charges of human rights abuses, has been a major source of friction with Western Europe and is a significant reason why Turkey has not been admitted into the EU. The other security issue concerns water resources. Turkey controls the headwaters of both the Tigris and the Euphrates rivers. During a drought, Turkey could slow or even stop the flow of water into Iraq and Syria. This act would devastate both of these countries' economies and could prompt major attacks by both into this sparsely populated region. In this scenario, Turkey could require NATO's assistance and USAREUR units could move to reinforce Turkey's defense and launch counterattacks.

Cyprus has occupied a special place in NATO policy making since 1974, when the Turkish Army invaded the northern half of the island to protect the minority Turkish Cypriot community after a coup d'état by Greek Cypriots who wanted the island to become part of Greece. Both Turkey and Greece are members of NATO. Negotiations on the fate of the island have been underway for years. So much time has passed that now the island consists of two ethnically homogeneous sectors patrolled by a UN peacekeeping force. A solution to the conflict could hypothetically require a U.S. military presence. However, the United States has historically taken a neutral stance on the issue due to the prominence of other pressing international issues.

Israel receives more military aid from the United States than any other nation. Currently, Israel maintains military forces superior to those of any of its neighbors. In 1979 Israel signed a peace treaty with Egypt, and a multinational peacekeeping force led by the United States patrols the border in the Sinai desert. Later, Israel signed an agreement with Jordan, and it is currently negotiating with the Palestinians for peace on the West Bank and Gaza. Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak is also trying to negotiate a peace with Syria over the Golan Heights and has scheduled a withdrawal of Israeli forces from southern Lebanon. If negotiations fail and conflict resumes, it is unlikely that U.S. ground forces will get involved unless Israel is near the point of capitulation. However, if the negotiations are successful, U.S. peacekeeping forces may be part of the deal, especially to patrol the strategic Golan Heights.

E. AFRICA

NATO is very interested in the stability of North Africa and has set up the Mediterranean Dialogue to promote confidence building and communication. One of the

security challenges in the region is Libya, led by Colonel Moammar Gadhafi. Although Gadhafi is no longer a threat to his neighbors in conventional conflict, his support for international terrorism and his attempts to acquire weapons of mass destruction and long-range delivery vehicles make him and his country a threat to international peace and stability. When Gadhafi leaves power, no one is sure what type of government will replace him.

Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco are generally pro-Western, but they face an Islamic fundamentalist threat. Although terrorist acts against tourists have taken place in Egypt, the government for the most part has the situation under control. The situation is tense in Algeria, where the government chose in 1992 to suspend elections, fearing an Islamic fundamentalist victory. Morocco has a new king, who at the moment is popular. However, he must turn the economy around in the near term or face the rise of Islamic militants.

Sub-Saharan Africa continues to be plagued by civil and tribal wars. The abject poverty and diseases such as AIDS are of epidemic proportions. In the 1990s, USAREUR's SETAF supported humanitarian relief operations in Rwanda and the Congo, and assisted the Noncombatant Evacuation Operation (NEO) in Monroe, Liberia. Although the strategic interests of the United States and NATO are minimal in this region, developments such as the positive political change in Nigeria should be actively supported in order to stabilize the region.

F. THE BALKANS

Barring a major conflict, USAREUR will be directly involved in the Balkans throughout the next decade, at a minimum. The size of the Stabilization Force (SFOR) in

Bosnia has been reduced, but the mission will continue, as the factions are still unwilling to cooperate. In Kosovo, the situation is tense, as neither Kosovar Albanians nor Serbs are willing to work or live with each other. Ethnic Albanians continue to retaliate against Serbs in Kosovo and are launching attacks into Serbia proper even with the NATO military presence. Albania and Macedonia are so politically and militarily weak that they will remain NATO protectorates for the foreseeable future.

Both Bulgaria and Romania supported Operation Allied Force, even though their economies suffered heavily as a result. Both countries expect to be admitted to NATO in the next decade in return for their support and continued efforts at political, economic, and military reform. In Croatia, the election of a pro-Western and moderate government may be a key element in getting the Bosnian Croats to actively support the Bosnian government, and this may lead to the resettlement of the Krajina region. Slovenia has integrated its economy with the West and will almost surely become the next NATO member, thereby creating a land bridge to Hungary.

The key to the region continues to be Serbia. There will be no significant reduction to the NATO military presence in the region until the fall of the Serbian President, Slobodan Milosevic. However, it remains to be seen who will replace him and whether a new government will be constructive enough to allow for a more comprehensive regional peace plan to take shape.

G. NATO ALLIES, THE EUROPEAN UNION, AND ESDI

UNPROFOR's inept performance in Bosnia in 1992-95 and the absolute superiority U.S. military capabilities as demonstrated in the war in Kosovo in 1999 have spurred commitments by the European members of NATO and the EU to increase their

military capabilities. If acted upon, these commitments will strengthen the European Pillar of the NATO alliance and allow the European allies to act on non-Article 5 security matters without the participation of the United States. This European effort, led by France, is called the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI).

ESDI has the support of many nations, but the key to its success and NATO's future will be whether it is pursued *within* NATO. The French would like ESDI to be independent of NATO in order to cut what they deem the hegemonic "hyperpower" of the United States down to size. The British and the Germans, however, want ESDI to be formed within NATO in order to relieve the United States of some of its security burdens in Europe and thereby prevent an isolationist U.S. Congress from someday yanking American troops home out of disgust with unfair burden-sharing and European "free riding." All Europeans insist that contributing more treasure and, potentially, blood to the transatlantic partnership must also mean that Europe will gain more say in NATO decisions.²⁸ Currently both Germany and France are conducting major reviews of their military force structures. Both are expected to reduce their numbers of forces and defense budgets, but to create forces more relevant to the new security environment.

H. CONCLUSION

At the dawn of the 21st century, USAREUR will need to heed the trends in the international security environment and restructure forces in order to effectively carry out assigned missions within its area of responsibility. USAREUR is a part of NATO and is required to defend all NATO members under Article 5, but it also serves as the ground

²⁸ Pond, Elizabeth, "Come Together: Europe's Unexpected New Architecture," *Foreign Affairs* (March /April 2000), p. 11.

arm for USEUCOM. USEUCOM has geographic responsibility for all of Europe outside of Russia and most of Africa. USAREUR is also a contingent force provider for USCENTCOM (U.S. Central Command), which is responsible for East Africa, the Middle East, and Central Asia. Due to the global commitments of the United States, forward-deployed units should be able to accomplish most assigned missions within their AOR without reinforcement. As a result, a significant portion of USAREUR needs to be capable of rapid strategic deployment out of its bases in Central Europe. USAREUR must be ready to conduct operations in austere environments with varied terrain and climate.

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IV. TRANSFORMING THE U.S. ARMY IN EUROPE

A. INTRODUCTION

Owing in part to the rapid improvements in information technology, analysts have been debating whether we are in the middle of a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). Theodore Galdi explains that among RMA proponents, there is a debate over three basic conceptions: the end of the nation-state; a system of systems; and evolution, not revolution.²⁹

Some analysts, such as Carl Builder, argue that the global political, social, and economic factors at play are leading to a decline in the relative power of the nation-state in being able to control information, commodities, and people. This results in crises that require more emphasis on support forces than combat forces. As a result, it is argued, the U.S. military should change its focus away from big wars, and shrink the size of forces, but increase the diversity of capabilities within the remaining force so as to be able to operate successfully in the new environment.³⁰

The second, and largest, group of analysts focuses on rapidly changing technical capabilities as the dominant element of a potential RMA. The most visible advocate of this view is Admiral William Owens (retired), the former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who has proposed "a system of systems" approach. He has identified

²⁹ Galdi, Theodor W., *Revolution in Military Affairs?: Competing Concepts, Organization Responses, Outstanding Issues* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 1995), pp. 5-9.

³⁰ Builder, Carl H., "Looking in All The Wrong Places?: The Real Revolution in Military Affairs is Staring Us in the Face," *Armed Forces Journal International* (May 1995), pp. 38-39.

three overlapping areas: (1) intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; (2) command, control, communications, and intelligence processing; and (3) precision force. In his view, their interaction will create revolutionary change in the way warfare is conducted.³¹ Under this view the Department of Defense would focus on relatively small, highly sophisticated, and technologically advanced weapons and organizations. This type of warfare would be most effective against conventionally armed but less technologically advanced powers and less effective against opponents employing asymmetrical strategies such as guerrilla warfare.

The third group believes that the future will not involve radical changes, but rather a gradual evolution of existing military organizations and equipment. These analysts do not deny that rapid technological change is taking place, and that this change will greatly affect the military, but they argue that a true revolution in military affairs is unlikely in the near future. They believe that bureaucratic and domestic political factors will prevent a radical change in the existing organization in the near term, but the organization will still be able to deal with any challenges caused by new technology and/or a new geopolitical environment. In the long-term, it is argued, America's junior military personnel and the next generation of military personnel will be able to adapt to new technology and organizations better than any potential adversary.³²

³¹ Owens, William A., "A Report on the JROC and the Revolution in Military Affairs," *Marine Corps Gazette* (August 1995), pp. 48-50.

³² Galdi, Theodor W., *Revolution in Military Affairs?: Competing Concepts, Organization Responses, Outstanding Issues* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 1995), pp. 8-9.

Over the next twenty years, the U.S. Army will evolve from an industrial age Army to an information age Army. This transformation will have a significant impact on the near- and long-term structure of forces in U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR). However, the conservative nature of the military as a hedge against uncertainty, the slow pace of the bureaucracy, and the fight for limited resources with the Congress will complicate the pursuit of most attempts at radical change. These factors will together prolong the transformation of the military to a revolutionary force. This transformation process will have a significant impact on the American units in USEUCOM and on America's NATO allies. The U.S. military will have to be careful in transforming its forces in Europe because these changes could drastically affect interoperability and alliance cohesion.

B. WHAT IS A REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS?

Military revolutions comprise four elements: technological change, systems development, operational innovation, and organizational adaptation.³³ Today, most of the scholars writing on the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) are focused on the information age technology that is now just beginning to explode on the scene. Technology advances tend to be the basis of a military revolution, but they alone do not make the revolution. For emerging technologies to reach their full potential, they typically must be incorporated within new processes, including operational concepts, and executed by new organizational structures.³⁴

³³ Krepinevich, Andrew F., "Cavalry to Computer: The Pattern of Military Revolutions," *The National Interest* (Fall 1994), p. 30.

³⁴ Krepinevich, Andrew F., "Cavalry to Computer: The Pattern of Military Revolutions," *The National Interest* (Fall 1994), p. 36.

There is no common transition period from one military regime to another. What is revolutionary is not the speed with which the entire shift from one military regime to another occurs, but the recognition, over some relatively brief period, that methods of conducting military operations have changed dramatically, requiring equally dramatic, if not radical, changes in military doctrine and organizations.³⁵

C. THE U.S. ARMY AND RMAS: A HISTORY

Throughout its 224-year history the U.S. Army has experienced four military revolutions that have directly affected land warfare, but it has not initially fared well with any of them. In the early 1800s the Napoleonic Revolution changed the nature of land warfare in Europe. At this time the United States was not a world power and could not dream of competing in a war on European terrain against a great power. Napoleon integrated advances in technology (such as equipment standardization and lightweight artillery), military systems (the *levée en masse* and civil-military integration), and military organizations (including the staff system and the brigade, division and corps tactical organizations) so effectively that it took the rest of Europe fighting collectively a decade to defeat him. In the meantime, the United States fought the British to a draw in the War of 1812 with the same linear tactics used in the Revolutionary War thirty years earlier.

In the Civil War, the U.S. Army was at the forefront of the Land Warfare Revolution, but it took both the Union and Confederate Armies over three years of bloodshed before they understood the implications of the new technology. The railroad

³⁵ Krepinevich, Andrew F., "Cavalry to Computer: The Pattern of Military Revolutions," *The National Interest* (Fall 1994), pp. 30-31.

allowed for the strategic movement of forces between theaters, and allowed mass armies to sustain the fight in uninhabited and uncultivated regions. The telegraph allowed for faster long-distance communication to coordinate the movements of large bodies of soldiers. At the tactical level, leaders on both sides remained a revolution behind. The increased accuracy and range of rifled musketry made Napoleonic tactics a slaughter. In the last year of the war, Napoleonic tactics disappeared in favor of entrenchments and operational flanking maneuvers.

The U.S. Army was fortunate in that it did not have to participate in World War II until two and a half years after its inception. The U.S. Navy and Army Air Corps were world-class organizations, and the Marine Corps developed a revolutionary amphibious warfare doctrine. The Army was a third-rate institution, however. It maintained obsolete forces such as horse cavalry up until the United States entered the war. The Army developed its own American approach to mechanization. The Americans emphasized tank mobility at the expense of firepower and armored protection, because they expected the next war to be fought on the expansive battlefield of the North American continent, and lacked insight and vision as to what emerging technology would be able to do.³⁶

Bureaucratic and domestic political factors also influenced the development of mechanization. Congress passed the National Defense Act of 1920, which abolished the Tank Corps, placed all tanks under control of the Chief of Infantry, and forbade the Army from creating more branches. In 1928 the Army created the Experimental Mechanized Force. In its experiments, this force validated a number of concepts, the most important

³⁶ Hendrix, John, "The Interwar Army and Mechanization: The American Approach," *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol.16, No.1 (March 1993), p.76.

being the use of combined arms and the need for mobility. In 1931, during the onset of the Great Depression and budget cuts, the Mechanized Force was disbanded. In an effort to placate interests throughout the Army, one regiment of cavalry and one regiment of infantry incorporated tanks into their existing organizations. This struck a compromise between those who wanted an independent mechanized force and those who opposed mechanization, and reaffirmed the infantry as the decisive arm while the cavalry's mission and spirit remained intact.³⁷

The German victory over France in June 1940 woke the U.S. Army up to the advantages of combined arms armored formations with tanks that had better armor protection and firepower. However, the Army could not reform or equip itself with modern equipment fast enough while simultaneously expanding rapidly with draftees in an attempt to prevent defeat in the Philippines, and it encountered early problems in offensive actions in North Africa, the Solomon Islands, and New Guinea.

The U.S. Army also adapted unsuccessfully to the next revolution in military affairs, the Nuclear Revolution. In the mid-1950s after the Korean War, the Army was fighting for its survival within the confines of President Eisenhower's New Look. The New Look emphasized the strategy of "massive retaliation," which called for a heavy emphasis on nuclear weapons, primarily U.S. Air Force bombers, to deter the Soviet Union from attacking the United States or its allies. To maintain fiscal responsibility, the Air Force received the lion's share of the budget, while the Army's share was drastically cut. To maintain a budget and the force, the Army Chief of Staff, General Maxwell

³⁷ Hendrix, John, "The Interwar Army and Mechanization: The American Approach," *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol.16, No.1 (March 1993), pp. 78-83.

Taylor, aligned the Army with President Eisenhower's New Look strategy by focusing the Army on developing missiles and acquiring tactical nuclear weapons.

To adapt to the conditions of the nuclear battlefield, the Army decided to create a new combat organization. The importance of dispersing to improve survivability against nuclear weapons exercised the greatest influence on the new structure. Dispersion meant units had to operate autonomously and be organized with their own support to be capable of conducting independent actions. Units also had to be quick and flexible to mass for offensive actions and then quickly disperse to avoid being annihilated by nuclear fires. A new formation, the battle group, consisting of five companies of five platoons each, was chosen to be the base for the new division. Emphasizing the recurrence of the number five (five battle groups with support coming from five mortar companies, five howitzer batteries, and five service companies) and the organization's intended employment in atomic war, the Army named the structure the Pentomic Division.³⁸

Equipped with these new units, U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) was not capable of holding a Soviet invasion force without using its tactical nuclear weapons. General Taylor called the battle groups "counter attrition forces" and said,

In general war, they must cover the vital ground areas in which they are deployed and hold the enemy at arm's length while we punish him with our weapons of great destruction. Thereafter they must have the residual strength to occupy his lands and claim whatever may be called victory. For limited war, they must be strong enough to turn back infiltrators, raids, and border forays and gain the necessary time to make sure of an enemy's intentions.³⁹

³⁸ Bacevich, A.J., *The Pentomic Era: The U.S. Army Between Korea and Vietnam* (Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1986), pp. 104-106.

³⁹ Taylor, quoted in Freedman, Lawrence, *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy*, 2nd edition, (New York: St. Martins Press in association with the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1997), p. 292.

When the Kennedy administration came into office, the catch-phrase used to describe the national security strategy switched from “massive retaliation” to “flexible response.” This change in strategy meant that nuclear weapons possibly would not be used in the event of a Soviet conventional attack into Western Europe. As a result, U.S. conventional forces would have to be strong enough (a) to deter a Soviet attack and (b) to defeat that attack if deterrence failed.

The Pentomic Divisions proved to be weak in staying power and needed more men to be capable of sustained combat. In late 1961, after significant lobbying, the Army received permission to completely change its organization from the Army Staff down to the tactical units. The division structure was reorganized to provide a better balance between mobility and firepower and to ensure greater flexibility. The Reorganization Objective Army Division (ROAD) concept formed four types of divisions – infantry, armor, airborne, and mechanized – each with a common base and three brigade headquarters.⁴⁰ Although it has been slightly modified since its inception, the ROAD is still the basis of the U.S. Army today.

Currently the U.S. Army is in the initial stages of the transition from the Cold War industrial age Army to an information age Army. Some scholars believe that a revolution in warfare has already occurred, and cite the crushing 100-hour victory during Operation Desert Storm as evidence. The conduct of the campaign did not meet the criteria for revolutionary change, as it did not display dramatic doctrinal changes or major

⁴⁰ Matloff, Maurice, ed., *American Military History* (Washington D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, United States Army, 1969), pp. 606-607.

new organizational force structures. Other scholars, such as Andrew Krepinevich, see Desert Storm as a precursor war – an indication of the revolutionary potential of emerging technologies and new military systems.⁴¹ Observers such as Andrew Marshall, the Director of Net Assessment, think Desert Storm was a late industrial age conflict, using new equipment in old ways, with only hints of the high technology future.⁴² General Walter Boomer, commander of U.S. Marines in the Gulf War, agrees: “General Patton could have walked into my command post and he would have understood everything.”⁴³

Except for the helicopter, today’s land warfare combat systems are merely improvements of systems used in World War II. Operational doctrine such as Air-Land Battle is an evolution of World War II combined arms doctrine enriched with lessons learned from the German Blitzkrieg, Soviet Combined Arms Army attacks, and the actions of General Patton’s 3rd Army during the war.

One of the first to write about an impending new revolution in military affairs was Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, Chief of the Soviet General Staff in the early 1980s. He and his staff advanced the notion of an imminent technical revolution that would give conventional weapons a level of effectiveness in the field comparable to that of small tactical nuclear weapons. This perceived military-technical revolution (MTR) would

⁴¹ Krepinevich, Andrew F., “Cavalry to Computer: The Pattern of Military Revolutions,” *The National Interest* (Fall 1994), p. 40.

⁴² Ricks, Thomas E., “Warning Shot: How Wars are Fought Will Change Radically, Pentagon Planner Says,” *Wall Street Journal*, 15 July 1994, p. A4.

⁴³ Boomer quoted in Ricks, Thomas E. “Warning Shot: How Wars are Fought Will Change Radically, Pentagon Planner Says,” *The Wall Street Journal*, 15 July 1994, p. A4.

include long-range precision-guided anti-tank missiles that would be devastating in the Soviet conventional war strategy with NATO. The strategy rested on the orderly forward movement of massed echelons of tanks and armored vehicles. Ogarkov and his colleagues also realized that the Soviet Union could not possibly keep pace with the United States in an arms race driven by information technologies.⁴⁴

D. THE ROLE OF BUREAUCRACY AND DOMESTIC POLITICS

The U.S. Army has been able to develop new organizations to take advantage of new technologies, but these developments have historically come about through shrewd maneuvering within the bureaucracy and not by the appreciation of new technology by the Army as a whole.

The development of the airmobile division is a case in point. Airmobility was the brainchild of a small group of officers in the mid-1950s who believed that an Army capability to rapidly concentrate and disperse troops on a nuclear battlefield in Europe was essential to survival. The Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, General James Gavin, contended on the basis of experiences in Korea, that helicopters were the answer to this problem. Although his efforts for a large helicopter force were rebuffed, Gavin placed subordinates who shared his views about the helicopter's capability in strategic positions within the bureaucracy. Within ten years, these men, such as Generals Hamilton Howze, Robert Williams, and Harry O. Kinnard, assisted in the development of a new generation of helicopters and of the doctrine and organization of the airmobile division to take advantage of the new capability. Although structured for fighting high-

⁴⁴ Cohen, Eliot A., "A Revolution in Warfare," *Foreign Affairs*, (March/April 1996), p. 39.

intensity wars in Europe or Korea, the airmobile division earned its fame fighting a low-to medium-intensity war in Vietnam.⁴⁵

Since the end of the 1990-91 Gulf War, the Department of Defense (DOD) and the military services have thought about systems, doctrine, and organizations that incorporate emerging technology to accomplish perceived missions. In 1993, the Clinton administration announced that a Bottom-Up Review (BUR) would conduct a thorough reexamination of U.S. defense policy. The goals of the BUR were to shape DOD and the military services to meet the future security environment. The military services, led by General Colin Powell, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, preceded the BUR with the Base Force Plan and lobbied hard to prevent drastic restructuring. The BUR called for a force capable of fighting simultaneously two major regional contingencies (MRCs) as demanding as the Gulf War. By structuring its analysis around enemy forces similar to those of Iraq and North Korea, the BUR guaranteed a conservative approach in military thought at odds with the thorough reexamination promised by the administration early in its tenure. For this reason, among others, the revolution in military affairs will take far longer to complete than the Soviets predicted in the 1980s. Barring the pressure of severe competition between the United States and some state capable of posing a real challenge to it, even available technologies are unlikely to be exploited fully. Military institutions in peacetime will normally evolve rather than submit to radical change.⁴⁶

⁴⁵ Krepinevich, Andrew F., *The Army in Vietnam* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), pp. 112-121.

⁴⁶ Cohen, Eliot A., "A Revolution in Warfare," *Foreign Affairs*, (March/April 1996), p.52.

Most assessments of the future long-term security environment do not foresee armored land battles such as the one that took place during the Gulf War, but the use of long-range precision fires against enemy concentrations, command and control nodes, and critical infrastructure. In this scenario ground combat forces would man sensors to direct long-range fires and to verify the impact of the rounds. Assessments also indicate the probability of more operations other than war (OOTW) to stabilize failed states or to assist states recovering from civil war or from defeat. These operations will require a lot of light forces such as infantry and military police.

This projected future environment is at odds with the Army's current reliance on armor and mechanized forces. The force requirements for the 2 MRC strategy developed in the BUR, and the continuing posture of Iraq and North Korea, have saved these forces in the near term. The Army examined the requirements for future warfare, developed a new Army doctrine, and incorporated networking digital technology combined with automotive and weapons improvements to upgrade its armor and mechanized forces in an attempt to modernize and be a relevant force in the future. This evolutionary upgrade has been named Force XXI.⁴⁷

In 1995, the 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) from Fort Hood, Texas, was designated to be the experimental force (EXFOR) for Force XXI. The unit was outfitted with the latest equipment, received intense training and contractor support for the new systems, and conducted a series of advanced warfighting exercises (AWEs), culminating with a rotation at the National Training Center (NTC) to conduct "force on

⁴⁷ Galdi, Theodor W., *Revolution in Military Affairs?: Competing Concepts, Organizational Responses, Outstanding Issues* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 1995), p. 13.

force" training. The AWE at the NTC validated many of the concepts for future warfare, but cast a shadow on many others. The improved sensors and fire control systems made the force much more lethal, even though it is only three-quarters the size of a current brigade. The tactical internet never operated satisfactorily, but new systems architecture and faster networking computers should fix the problem. The new logistics system, emphasizing supply on demand, could not adequately supply or maintain the force in a timely fashion, so additional manpower resources were placed back into the logistics system. These lessons and others from the AWE were incorporated, and changes to the design of Force XXI were approved. III Corps is scheduled to become the first digitized corps by the end of FY2003.

The current armor and mechanized forces of the U.S. Army are more survivable, mobile, and lethal at the tactical level than those of any other military establishment in the world. The Force XXI upgrades will make this advantage even greater. However, regardless of how well they now operate at the tactical level, these forces currently are a strategic liability in certain aspects and may become vulnerable to future long-range precision weapons. The current force was built to fight the Warsaw Pact in Western Europe. Major General Burwell B. Bell, commanding general of Fort Knox and the U.S. Army Armor Center, has summed up the criticism of the current heavy force in today's environment as follows:

We built a suite of platforms that dominated the Soviet threat to Western Europe. Each platform had at its core a requirement for battlefield effectiveness encompassing lethality and survivability. Because we were able to prepare the battlefield for almost 50 years, many battlefield mobility concerns were solved through engineering efforts. We dramatically reinforced all the bridges so we could cross M1 tank formations. We improved the road infrastructure to give us the agility we

needed and prepared battle positions in depth. We stockpiled enormous amounts of supplies and repair parts. Last, we prepositioned or forward-deployed equipment on the battlefield to field 10 divisions in 10 days. Today, however, as we try to deploy formations employing the big five [weapon systems] to immature theaters, we find that the deployability, mobility, and sustainability characteristics required for decisive strategic and operational maneuver are not resident in our force. Operation Desert Shield, Somalia, Bosnia, Albania, and Kosovo all instruct us that our superb and winning Cold War capability, designed for operations in an extensively prepared battlefield, does not provide us with the requisite capability for the small-scale contingencies that confront us in the post-Cold War environment.⁴⁸

Force XXI is too heavy. The M1-SEP (Systems Enhancement Program) main battle tank weighs 72 tons. Only one of these machines can fit in a C-17 or C-5 aircraft for movement to a new theater. Once the force arrives, it has to be sustained. These forces require massive amounts of fuel, ammunition, and spare parts, plus food and water for the combat troops and the support personnel. New weapons, such as the Brilliant Anti-Tank (BAT) munition, which can be fired from as far as 200km away and use acoustic and visual sensors to fly to the target, may make armor forces vulnerable on the battlefield again.

The Army has invested so much money in these heavy systems that it will be very hard, especially when these systems are still the best in the world, to change to something else. In addition, military-industrial interests will lobby both the Congress and the Department of Defense to continue to upgrade the core combat equipment procured during the Carter-Reagan defense build up (including the M-1 Abrams tank, the M-2 Bradley fighting vehicle, the AH-64 Apache helicopter, the UH-60 Blackhawk

⁴⁸ Major General Bell, quoted in Steele, Dennis, "The Army Stages a Kentucky Demo To Define 'the Art of the Possible,'" *ARMY Magazine*, vol.50, no.3, (March 2000), p. 22.

helicopter, the Multiple-Launch Rocket System (MLRS), the Patriot air defense system, the HMMWV tactical vehicle, and the HMMTT cargo truck) of the 1980s and to replace obsolescent combat support equipment by procuring new equipment (such as the Crusader Advanced Field Artillery System, the RAH-66 Comanche Helicopter, the Wolverine Assault Bridge, the Grizzly Breaching Vehicle, the Bradley Linebacker Air Defense Vehicle, the Bradley Fire Support Vehicle, the Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles, the Command and Control Vehicle, the Future Scout Vehicle, and the Javelin Anti-Tank missile) that will enhance the capabilities of the armor force.

While the Army leadership was looking ahead with Force XXI, the Army completed the reduction to an authorized strength of 495,000 soldiers. With its reduced size and changes in the international environment, the Army's operations tempo (OPTEMPO) has drastically increased. Since 1989, the average frequency of Army contingency deployments has increased from one every four years to one every fourteen weeks.⁴⁹ Deployments to Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo have demonstrated the changes taking place in the international environment and have changed the Army from a forward-deployed garrison force in Europe and Korea to primarily a United States-based expeditionary force. These deployments have provided many lessons on which to base the future structure of the Army, but they have exhausted the Army. Funds needed for post-deployment and sustainment training and maintenance of equipment have been used to pay for deployments. More importantly, funds for research and development have also been slashed. The result is that many promising systems have

⁴⁹ Caldera, Louis, and Eric K. Shinseki, *A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army Fiscal Year 2001* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, February 2000), p. xi.

had to be canceled, and research into future concepts for the Army After Next has been put on hold.

Three important events in 1999 could help spur the Army along its evolutionary path. First, for the first time since 1985, the defense budget received an increase in real dollars. The increase in the operations and maintenance account will help readiness by allowing for more training and for more parts necessary to maintain equipment. The Army also received more money for upgrades on current equipment and for the procurement of new equipment. In addition, funds for research and development were added to allow the Army to place more focus on the future force.

The second event was the embarrassing deployment of Task Force Hawk to Albania during the war in Kosovo. This reinforced the point that the Army, and USAREUR in particular, is too heavy for the tasks at hand in today's international security environment.

The third event was the appointment of General Eric Shinseki to become the new Army Chief. Shinseki, a former commander of USAREUR, also served as the commander of SFOR in Bosnia. Having spent the majority of his career in Europe, he has seen the vast changes in the security environment of the region since the end of the Cold War. As the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, he was responsible for providing Army requirements for improved capabilities to the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) and became thoroughly knowledgeable regarding the new systems under development and the status of current forces. Moreover, he was able to establish a working relationship with the new Commandant of the Marine Corps. This relationship

will help the two services develop systems together, an arrangement that will assist in joint operations and reduce the overall cost of systems through larger purchases.

After viewing the Task Force Hawk debacle in Albania, Shinseki revealed his vision of the Army. He wants the Army to maintain dominance across the full spectrum of conflict, from humanitarian aid to major theater war. He wants to shape the Army over time by using new technology to create a middleweight force that would be as deployable and agile as today's light forces, but also retain the lethality and survivability of today's heavy forces. In addition, these forces must be able to significantly reduce the logistics footprint by going to one vehicle design, leveraging "reach back" electronic support capabilities, and revolutionizing the logistics system.⁵⁰

Shinseki has already ordered two brigades at Fort Lewis, Washington, one light and one heavy, to begin the transition to the new force. Instead of spending years developing new technology, these brigades will be equipped by buying available systems "off the shelf." The new systems placed in these organizations will be employed in exercises to test the cogency of the organizational design and operational concept.

General Shinseki's vision is meeting with a mixed reception within the Army. The armor community, which stands to be the big loser in this vision, is not happy about the idea of giving up most of its tanks. However, Shinseki is an armor officer and well respected within the armor community, and this should help him in trying to sell his vision. The light infantry community also has reservations about the vision. Although the new design will add much-needed tactical mobility, firepower, and improved

⁵⁰ Shinseki, Eric K., "The Army Vision: Soldiers on Point for the Nation... Persuasive in Peace, Invincible in War." Available [Online]: <http://www.army.mil/CSAVision/default.html> [12 January 2000].

communications, the reliance on vehicles means the force will have a difficult time operating in restricted terrain. The airborne community will try to maintain its distinctiveness, and will argue for retaining its forced entry mission, its current organizational structure, and its status as an elite.

Although the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) has been pushing for the Army to change, it has told the Army that the new Army Vision must be done under current budget restrictions. This means compromises will have to be made. As a result one can expect the Army to become a well-rounded force in the near term with advanced heavy and light forces along with a few brigades of the new Interim Force.

The current level of technology will limit the capabilities of the Interim Force. The current generation of light armored vehicles is not survivable on the high intensity battlefield and lacks the mobility to maneuver in mountainous or jungle terrain or to fight on the low end of the spectrum. However, mobility and survivability technology has been improving at a rapid rate, and it is hoped that by 2010 a future combat vehicle can begin development to meet the requirements of the Objective Force. At the same time computer networking will also advance, making the C4ISR architecture smaller, more accessible, and easier to operate.

The United States Constitution gives the Congress alone "the power...to provide for the common defense...to raise and support Armies...to make rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval forces...to declare war...and to make laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying out the foregoing powers."⁵¹

⁵¹ *United States Constitution*, Article 1, Section 8.

Therefore, any major changes to the Army will require the consent of Congress. Most members of Congress support a strong defense establishment, but of their main priorities is to retain the support of the constituents that elected them. Since some Congressmen tend to be more concerned with local issues than with national security, their decisions on the Army budget will be heavily influenced by bills that directly affect their constituents.

One of the most important issues for any Congressman's constituents is the economy. Military bases provide enormous economic benefits to local communities by providing civilian employment and military personnel to spend money. Congressmen will vote for plans that ensure that bases in their districts and states remain open and active. Congressmen continually try to get military construction bills passed to improve these bases and to provide work for local contractors. In May 1999, Congress voted not to allow another round of military base closures even though the military has, according to one estimate, 23 percent of excess capacity, which will cost \$3.2 billion to maintain annually.⁵²

Other military facilities such as depots and arsenals are almost entirely staffed by civilian workers. Congressmen will try to maintain enough work for these facilities to keep them open and fully operational. In many locations, defense contractors are the largest employers. Closure of these defense production plants would be devastating to these communities, so Congressmen will fight to ensure that the systems built at local plants continue to be bought by the military. This is one reason why manufacturing-intensive systems such as airplanes and ships are continually constructed, in contrast with

⁵² Maze, Rick, "Congress Nixes Another Round of Base Closings," *Army Times*, 7 June 1999, p. 29.

cheaper Army systems that are produced intermittently. Congressmen heavily support the National Guard and Reserves. Any plan that transforms the Army must include assurances that the Guard and Reserve will receive an appropriate portion of the funds.⁵³

Once the Army receives full support for its transformation, Congressmen will fight to have the new units stationed on bases in their districts and states instead of stationing them in overseas locations, in order to help ensure the long-term survival of these installations. As long as European NATO allies are seen as not pulling their weight, Congressmen will be hard-pressed to vote for bills to transform American forces stationed in Europe ahead of those stationed in the United States.

E. EUROPEAN ALLIES AND THE RMA

The war in Kosovo was not only a wake-up call for the U.S. Army, but also for Europe. The European allies lacked the capability to handle this crisis without help from the United States. For decades, leaders in both the United States and Europe have been talking about strengthening the European Pillar of the NATO alliance. In fact, the opposite has occurred, as defense expenditures have fallen dramatically in most NATO European countries. The Europeans maintain excellent armored formations, but in today's security environment, these forces are strategically irrelevant. The Europeans lack critical capabilities required in modern expeditionary warfare such as strategic airlift, C4ISR, and long-range precision weapons.

Since the Alliance's intervention in the Kosovo conflict, the leaders of the European Union (EU) have discussed increasing their military capabilities. In December

⁵³ Lindsay, James M., *Congress and Nuclear Weapons* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), pp. 127-136.

1999 the EU states set the goal of being able to deploy up to 60,000 troops by 2003 for up to a year. However, most European Union nations are unwilling to increase defense spending to augment capabilities.

The United States and NATO Europe have different perspectives on the RMA. The United States military is capable of conducting expeditionary interventions at great distances. The United States is spending billions of dollars to develop new technologies and military systems that no other nation can match. In contrast, the Europeans are focused on regional security issues. In the foreseeable future the political and economic integration of the European Union will be the focus. To help pay for other European priorities, defense budgets will probably continue to decrease.

For an RMA to succeed in NATO Europe, the European allies must overcome four challenges. First, they need to realize that they cannot afford to pursue RMA capabilities on an exclusively national basis and that they must therefore invest their efforts in trans-Atlantic cooperation. Second, they must modernize their defense industries to be able to compete in the global environment. Third, they must begin to reshape forces for the new security environment. Fourth, each European nation must look beyond its immediate concerns to achieve a better capability for the alliance as a whole.⁵⁴

If the Europeans do not cooperate to develop their own RMA capabilities or work with the United States to develop NATO RMA capabilities, the mismatch in capabilities could cause friction within the Alliance. The European nations evidently do not intend to

⁵⁴ Laird, Robbin F., and Holger Mey, *The Revolution in Military Affairs: Allied Perspectives* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1999), pp. 26-27.

seriously invest in the RMA during the next ten years. By 2010, the United States should be in a position to begin the deployment of more advanced RMA capabilities. The Europeans may then choose to jump on the bandwagon of American technology and organizational changes or remain a few years behind the United States by relying on the United States to field and improve systems and organizations, and then copying them with a European slant. If the European allies choose not to pursue RMA capabilities, some of them may become specialists in non-RMA activities such as truck transport, ammunition handling, rear-area security, peacekeeping, and medical support.

A divergence in capabilities of this magnitude would be politically, militarily, and strategically unsound. Having the United States provide the main combat forces while the Europeans provide support forces is not a formula for effective coalition-building. Giving obsolescent European armies zones on the battlefield would hypothetically allow the enemy to exploit weaker forces and thereby place American forces in jeopardy and put the entire NATO campaign at risk.⁵⁵

In the near term USAREUR will reflect the rest of the U.S. Army by having a mix of light, medium, and heavy forces in order to accomplish missions in theater across the entire spectrum of conflict. The necessity of a large deployment of forces to accomplish the mission will require the use of all three types of forces, or assistance from forces stationed in the United States or from forces of the NATO allies.

⁵⁵ Gompert, David C., Richard L. Kugler, and Martin C. Libicki, *Mind the Gap: Promoting a Transatlantic Revolution in Military Affairs* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1999), pp. 36-37.

The armies of the NATO allies will not have to undergo radical organizational or equipment change to remain interoperable with USAREUR in the near term. However, NATO European armies need to develop the ability to plug into NATO C4ISR networks and/or those operated by the United States. In addition, NATO European ground forces must become more deployable for out-of-area contingency missions. The main requirement is to create highly trained priority units made up of long-term volunteers that can sustain an operation for at least one year, unlike the current conscript armies in most of NATO Europe.

By 2010, the U.S. military will become more comfortable with new technology, and the equipment that makes up the forces in NATO Europe will begin to show its age. At this point the United States and its European allies will have to make major investments to create the next generation of fighting forces and to maintain interoperability. If these investments are not made, either both the U.S. and European forces will be obsolescent or one will be so far ahead of the other that a large gap in capability and interoperability will exist.

F. CONCLUSION

With the dramatic shift in the international security environment and the improvements in information technology, the world seems to be on the cusp of a Revolution in Military Affairs. However, the transformation of the military from the industrial age to the information age may be slow enough to seem evolutionary. Technology will be the primary driver of this revolution, but it may prove to be a two-edged sword. For all of the promised advances that information age technology will bring to the U.S. military, it may also improve the capabilities of some potential

adversaries even more. The proliferation of missile technology and weapons of mass destruction has put the United States homeland at risk from small countries for the first time. Instead of challenging America's superiority on the high-intensity battlefield, enemies may choose to pursue asymmetrical strategies such as area denial or guerrilla warfare to exploit American weaknesses.

Although information technology will bring many advances in the future, it is vulnerable to both malfunctions and manipulation. An over-reliance on information age technology by the U.S. military could make the nation vulnerable in the future. Information warfare, both offensive and defensive, is starting to play a more prominent role. An enemy could strike offensively by hacking into computer networks to manipulate or disable key systems or could use defensive measures such as Global Positioning System (GPS) jammers to confuse our precision strike systems that rely on GPS for guidance. (Such jammers could, however, be attacked with anti-radiation missiles.)

By taking an ambitious approach towards transforming the Army, General Shinseki may move the bureaucracy and the Congress to get at least part of his vision accomplished. Although the premise of the Army Vision is sound, care must be taken to prevent the kind of mistakes the Army made with mechanization in the interwar period and with the Pentomic Army in the 1950s. The uncertainty of the current international security environment offers many similarities to these two periods. It is essential that the United States Army get it right this time.

V. CONCLUSION: DESIGNING A NEW FORCE STRUCTURE

A. INTRODUCTION

In the previous chapters, an analysis of USAREUR's history, the future security environment, the impact of information age technology, and the probable influence of Congress and the military bureaucracy has been conducted.

The analysis of USAREUR's history demonstrated that American troops in Europe have contributed to the security and stability of the region and have served as the bulwark of the NATO alliance. In the 1990s, even after the evaporation of the Soviet threat and the U.S. force drawdown, USAREUR remained a stabilizing element in the region. During the past decade NATO has accepted collective security responsibilities while remaining an alliance dedicated to collective defense. USAREUR remains tied to NATO and is engaged in multinational land formations (including the ACE Rapid Reaction Corps, the U.S.-German Corps, and the ACE Immediate Reaction Force). USAREUR was the lead element of the deployment of IFOR to Bosnia in 1995 and the USAREUR commander is also in command of all military forces participating in SFOR. Approximately 6,000 American soldiers currently patrol their own sector in southeastern Kosovo trying to keep the peace and the region stable. The continued presence of a strong United States Army in Europe over the next twenty years will serve as a strong deterrent force that will promote stability and help insure peace throughout the region.

The future security environment will require USAREUR to have forces capable of rapid deployment and operational employment from its bases in Central Europe to the far reaches of the USEUCOM AOR. USAREUR will continue to be a multi-mission force.

The most important and most likely missions for USAREUR will be the following: support for NATO integrated activities to keep the alliance militarily strong; peacekeeping and peacemaking in trouble spots in the region; rapid intervention and reinforcement to keep conflicts from expanding to neighboring states; and military-to-military contacts to assist other armies in adjusting to Western-style military operations and organizations.

Over the next two decades, the impact of information age technology will transform USAREUR and NATO allied armies. The pace of change and the manner in which this technology is adopted will influence alliance cohesion and the interoperability of military forces. In changing the structure of USAREUR, one has to consider the effects not only on the U.S. Army, but on the alliance as well. The new technology will also give advantages to potential adversaries. The diffusion of missile technology and weapons of mass destruction places a premium on Theater Ballistic Missile Defense systems (TMD) to defend U.S. and allied forces and European homelands from attacks emanating from the periphery. In addition, the new technology, if utilized effectively, could allow adversaries to conduct a strategy of area denial to prevent the deployment of forces into an area.

Domestic politics will limit the size of America's military involvement in Europe. Unless there is a serious crisis, the United States will probably not increase its commitment much beyond the approximately 100,000 servicemen and women currently stationed in Europe. Unless the Europeans begin to provide more for their own defense, the United States Congress may force further troop reductions in Europe. To protect the jobs and other economic benefits of military installations in their districts and states,

Congressmen and Senators will be hard-pressed to vote for funds for construction of new bases and facilities in Europe, but will readily approve further base closures in Europe. Some members of Congress are reportedly already skeptical of the new Army Vision and will most likely vote to protect workers employed in manufacturing the components and systems for the current generation of military hardware.

The military bureaucracy will also slow the pace of change within the Army. However, the new bold vision and determined attempts to implement it may push the bureaucracy far enough to actually get some of it accomplished.

B. FORCE CHARACTERISTICS

For USAREUR to be an effective force in the future while meeting alliance and domestic concerns, it must be structured to provide six characteristics: visibility, capability, flexibility, expandability, interoperability, and cost effectiveness.⁵⁶

1. Visibility

To justify continuing American leadership in NATO, USAREUR forces should not be reduced below their current numerical levels, and they must be seen as being capable of effective action. Army soldiers and officers need to be placed in leadership and staff positions in all of the NATO commands. Visibility is not only about being seen, but also about what the Allies see. Any redesign must maintain a highly trained force, one structured and equipped to meet the likely challenges of the security environment, while continuing to demonstrate America's ability and resolve to reinforce Europe in a large-scale emergency.

⁵⁶ Howe, Robert D., and Edgar Kleckley, *Planning for the Future U.S. Army in Europe* (Santa Monica, California: RAND, 1992), pp. 9-10.

2. Capability

USAREUR needs to continue to be the best Army in Europe to deter aggression against Allies and to serve as a role model for other armies to emulate. This requires a force that is fully manned, well-trained, and armed with excellent equipment. A corps is the smallest unit that has genuine operational capabilities for maneuvering independently far from the United States. Any smaller force would tend to be of only symbolic significance.⁵⁷ Within the corps a significant effort must be made to determine the proper quantity of combat, combat support, and combat service support forces. They must be structured properly so they can train for and be supportable in actual operations. Too large a proportion of any of these three types of forces will lead to lower levels of training and inevitably to reduced morale.

3. Flexibility

Units in USAREUR need to be able to accomplish missions across the broad spectrum of military conflict from humanitarian aid and peacekeeping to forced entry and main defense. In addition, these forces must be able to deploy rapidly from Central Europe to the farthest reaches of the USEUCOM AOR, to reinforce USCENTCOM, and to conduct operations in all types of terrain and against a broad array of adversaries. Since most operations will be conducted with NATO allies, USAREUR forces need to be adaptable to operate in Combined Joint Task Forces, but they must also be able to conduct operations of a limited nature unilaterally without reinforcement from units from the United States.

⁵⁷ Odom, William, *America's Military Revolution: Strategy and Structure After the Cold War* (Washington, D.C.: The American University Press, 1993), p. 84.

4. Expandability

As in the past, should war or a crisis situation of a large magnitude arise, reinforcements from the United States will be critical. If a large-scale emergency occurred requiring main defense forces, it is assumed that there would be a long warning time to deploy forces from the United States. Given the remote likelihood of such a contingency, the main concern is backfilling Europe if USAREUR troops are deployed to another theater as they were during the 1990-1991 Gulf War. The United States needs to maintain adequate quantities of prepositioned equipment in Europe and to conduct deployment exercises to maintain proficiency. These measures will demonstrate to the Europeans that the United States is serious about their protection and about the defense of U.S. and allied interests in and beyond Europe.

5. Interoperability

Any force structure for USAREUR must be interoperable with other NATO armies. Units need to continue to be structured along the same lines for the multinational units to operate at an optimum level. With the rapid improvements in communications technology, USAREUR needs to have systems that can communicate with the NATO allies. Although each nation is responsible for its own logistics, operations would be much simpler if forces used the same types of supplies such as fuel, ammunition, and batteries.

6. Cost Effectiveness

Barring a major conflict there can be no expectation of a significant increase in the defense budget. Even if there is an increase in funds, it is doubtful that a large portion would make its way to the forces in Europe. Any additional spending on the forces in

Europe must provide a corresponding increase in capability that will enhance USAREUR's ability to influence and react to events in and beyond Europe.

C. DESIGN CONCEPTS

USAREUR cannot be designed in isolation. Because it constitutes approximately 20 percent of the active Army force structure, USAREUR affects the Army's overall capabilities. Any changes in the force structure of USAREUR may lead to changes in units in the United States and vice versa. An analysis of the force characteristics required for USAREUR suggests that there are only three adequate options: Force XXI, accelerated transformation, and the mixed force.

1. Force XXI

This is the option currently being planned for USAREUR. In this option there would not be any significant changes to the basic structure of the current force. By the end of FY 2000, V Corps will complete the reorganization of its units in accordance with Force XXI guidelines. This reorganization will eliminate one of the four line companies from the combat battalions while creating a reconnaissance company for the brigade headquarters. The rationale behind this change is that these heavy units, now smaller, will become easier to deploy while the digital technology and system improvements will make the remaining forces so much more efficient that the change will actually increase combat power. However, units in Europe are not scheduled to receive the digital upgrades until FY 2008, leaving the modified force less capable than at present in the interim.

The Force XXI option would allow the United States to maintain visibility within the NATO alliance because USAREUR would remain the most capable heavy ground

force in Europe, especially after it receives its upgrades. However, this option would be of limited utility in conducting operations in the lower tier of the conflict spectrum – that is, the operations most likely to be required. Even with their smaller size, Force XXI units could not rapidly deploy out of Central Europe because of the weight of the vehicles and the volume of the supplies necessary to sustain them. This option would, however, provide the backbone for NATO to counter an invasion, and it would remain expandable with three brigades' worth of POMCUS equipment and assigned forces in the United States prepared to deploy and draw on them for combat. This option would be the cheapest in terms of monetary cost. It would not create major interoperability problems, nor would it require changes to the force structure of units in the United States.

2. Accelerated Transformation

As the objective to transform the Army to the new intermediate brigade structure evolves and gains support, another option for USAREUR would be accelerated transformation. In this option, one division would remain heavy and be upgraded to the Force XXI design, as mentioned above, while the other division would transform its two combat brigades to the new interim force structure (medium brigade). This option would maintain the same visibility as the Force XXI option, but would be more flexible and capable. Being lighter and designed for deployment by air, the interim force brigades would be much easier to deploy and sustain than heavier units. The interim force brigade would also be able to successfully operate across a wider portion of the conflict spectrum. This interim force division, combined with a heavy Force XXI division and the SETAF airborne battalion, would make USAREUR capable of accomplishing missions across the

entire conflict spectrum except in areas of extremely restricted terrain such as jungles and mountains.

This option would create challenges in expanding the force. The armored brigade from Fort Riley that is assigned to be the third brigade for the interim division may lack the C4I infrastructure to integrate effectively into the division while its heavy combat systems could be detrimental to the mission. This division would be the logical choice to be the American representative to the ARRC – the Allied Command Europe (ACE) Rapid Reaction Corps. How the interim force is constructed and what systems are assigned and developed would determine the magnitude of any interoperability problems. The most important factor hindering the pursuit of this option would be the cost of transforming a whole division to the interim force structure. The Army forecast projects only enough money for the procurement of only five to seven of these brigades for the entire Army. It would be difficult to justify the expense of placing two of these brigades in Europe. This fact alone makes this option the most expensive of the three.

3. Mixed Force

The remaining option is the mixed force. In this option, V Corps combat units would be organized with a mix of heavy, medium, and light brigades. This option would increase visibility, capability, and flexibility compared to the other two options. The greatest advantage would be the flexibility. By having light, medium, and heavy units in theater, USAREUR would have the ability to successfully conduct limited operations across the entire spectrum of conflict without requiring immediate reinforcement from units in the United States. The significant increase in flexibility would also increase the capability of USAREUR. By maintaining an adequate ratio of combat, combat support,

and combat service support units tied together with an advanced C4I system, the mixed force option would make USAREUR the most capable force possible, given its size.

As the European armies convert some of their heavy units to lighter early reaction forces, USAREUR would be structured to participate in multinational exercises, units, and operations. By playing a major role in providing contingency forces as well as transportation and communication systems, the United States would remain visible as the true leader in NATO. If this option is implemented, the method of expanding USAREUR could change or stay the same depending on the manner of implementation of the mixed force. This option is estimated to be in the middle between options one and two in terms of monetary cost.

The analysis above indicates that, of the three options, the best on several grounds is the mixed force. The mixed force would be superior because it would be more flexible, capable, and visible than the other two options, while being as interoperable and expandable. The Force XXI option would be the cheapest solution, but the improvements gained by building a mixed force would be enough to offset its increased cost.

D. DESIGN PLANS FOR THE MIXED FORCE

Within the mixed force option at least three distinct design plans deserve analysis. Each plan would give the units in USAREUR a slightly different structure. The heavy brigades would continue to be primarily composed of either mechanized infantry or armor. The medium brigade would be based on the intermediate force brigade that is being assembled at Fort Lewis, Washington. Because they are nearly identical in organizational structure and are equipped with substantial anti-armor assets, the light

brigade would be organized as an airborne or air assault unit, or as a combination of the two.

1. First Plan

The first plan would place the light brigade in one division and the medium brigade in the other. This plan would be the lowest in terms of cost because it would require few changes to the current structure. The medium brigade would be placed in Baumholder, Germany. Its large training area, firing ranges, support infrastructure, and proximity to Ramstein Air Force Base make Baumholder the logical location for the medium brigade. The light brigade would be placed in Schweinfurt, Germany. Baumholder and Schweinfurt currently are the garrisons for the mechanized infantry brigades. These brigades would be easier to convert to new structures because the light and medium brigades are also based on infantry. Under this plan there would essentially be no change in the corps CS and CSS units that would support the two divisions, and there would be no change to the expansion plan.

However, the mixed force divisions could create operational problems. The only mixed division in the current force, the 2nd Infantry Division in Korea, has a defensive mission. Upon alert, the division would occupy prepared battle positions constructed to be most advantageous to the types of unit occupying them. In Europe, the mixed divisions would be expected to deploy in an offensive manner far from their bases in Germany. The divergence in capabilities between the heavy and light forces in terms of deployability and tactical movement could lead to operational problems that would keep the division from functioning at an optimum level.

2. Second Plan

The second plan is to maintain the plan to transform one division to the Force XXI upgrade while converting the other division into a true mixed division of one light brigade, one medium brigade, and one reinforcing armor brigade. This plan makes more operational sense than the first plan. The converted division would be ideal as the American contingent for the ARRC because of its increased deployability. Its reinforcing armored brigade would provide the armored punch necessary for the main defense mission envisioned in its transfer to the German II Corps.

The 1st Armored Division would be the one to convert to the lighter design, because of its proximity to the large air bases at Ramstein, Rhine-Main, and Wiesbaden, and because it is the division currently charged with both the ARRC and German II Corps missions. This would minimize changes and costs. As in the first plan, the medium brigade would be placed in Baumholder, but in this plan the light brigade would be placed in Friedburg. This plan would be drastically improved if an armored brigade's worth of equipment was prepositioned afloat in the Mediterranean. This would provide the opportunity for an armored brigade to conduct a quick link-up with the rest of the division while minimizing the use of critical transport aircraft. As with the first plan, there would be little change to the Corps CS and CSS units. The main drawback to this plan would be the probable resistance of the armor community, which would lose a brigade command and three armor battalions to be replaced by infantry units.

3. Third Plan

The third design would vastly improve combat power and potential, while making the Army as a whole more productive. However, the number of changes necessary to

complete the plan, might cost too much. To begin with, it would require the transfer of the majority of the 1st Armored Division (headquarters, 4th Brigade, combat support battalions, and the Division Support Command) to Fort Riley, Kansas. Then the current 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division, in Friedburg, Germany, would exchange flags with the 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, at Fort Riley, Kansas. This would make the 1st Infantry Division a full division of three combat brigades in Germany. In addition, the headquarters of the 24th Infantry Division would have to transfer to Fort Jackson, South Carolina. This would improve the command and control relationships within that division because its brigades are composed of national guard units based in North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia.

The medium brigade would still be placed in Baumholder, Germany. The 2nd Brigade, 1st Armored Division, and the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment (2ACR) would switch locations between Fort Polk, Louisiana and Baumholder. Once in Baumholder, 2ACR would be transformed into a medium brigade. This would make III Corps in the United States a fully capable Corps of three heavy divisions. This would allow these heavy divisions to rotate alert status to deploy by ship to areas around the world.

The light brigade would be formed from the undersized Lion Brigade. Currently the Lion Brigade headquarters is in charge of only an airborne infantry battalion task force. It is capable of controlling three of these task forces. Because there will not be any construction funds to expand facilities in Italy, the Lion Brigade Headquarters would transfer from Vicenza, Italy, to Wiesbaden, Germany, and be reflagged as the 173rd Airborne Brigade. Once there, two newly formed infantry battalion task forces would be added to create a full brigade combat team.

The result would be similar to the current arrangement in Alaska. In that situation, the 172nd Infantry Brigade (-)⁵⁸ is located at Fort Wainwright, while an airborne battalion task force is stationed at Fort Richardson with the Headquarters U.S. Army Alaska. In this situation, the 173rd Airborne Brigade (-) would be stationed in Wiesbaden, Germany, while an airborne battalion task force would remain in Vicenza, Italy, with the SETAF Headquarters. To ensure better logistic support and coordination for training, SETAF and the brigade would fall under V Corps, but would normally be deployed on their own.

In all three plans, the SETAF headquarters would be enlarged to be capable of commanding a force the size of a reinforced division. SETAF would also become a true Joint Task Force Headquarters. To accomplish this, a Marine Corps Brigadier General would be assigned as the deputy commander. He and additional Navy and Marine Corps personnel would ensure a closer operational and training relationship with the Marine Corps and Navy assets that are continually maintained in the Mediterranean. Due to the nature of airborne rapid deployment forces, the Air Force would have a large presence to help with aerial transport, supply, and fire support. SETAF would also have NATO staff members to coordinate actions of the ACE Immediate Reaction Force (IRF), of which SETAF is the American component.

With the loss of a division to support, the Support Brigades for V Corps could be slightly reduced. Generally, each corps brigade would be organized with a headquarters

⁵⁸ The symbol (-) means part of the organization is not present. In this case the brigade is missing one battalion task force. In Alaska, the 172nd Infantry Brigade is stationed in Fort Wainwright, Alaska. However, the third battalion of the brigade and its normal attachments are stationed at Fort Richardson, Alaska. This situation is comparable to that with the proposed 173rd Airborne Brigade.

and two active battalions in Europe, with POMCUS equipment for one or two U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) or Army National Guard (ARNG) battalions to fall in on during crisis situations or during training exercises. This arrangement would provide enough CS and CSS units to support an increased number of combat forces in peacetime while maintaining the ability to expand for long-term operations.

This plan would effectively end the dual-basing arrangement (Germany, Fort Riley) that has been in place since 1995. However, the United States would still want to have forces prepared to reinforce units in case of an attack against NATO or to backfill Europe if USAREUR deployed the majority of its forces to another theater. The solution to this problem resides in the reserve component of the Army.

A number of factors make the Army National Guard Divisions the best choice for this mission. The active component of the Army, after major reductions in the 1990s, is now much smaller than the reserve component. The active component comprises only 45 percent of the combat forces, 37 percent of the combat support forces, and 31 percent of the combat service support forces.⁵⁹ These forces cost from one-half to two-thirds as much as an equivalent active force and they should be given operational missions. The chances of a large-scale land war in Europe over the next two decades appear remote; and if the risk of such a war increased, there would be a long warning time to deploy forces and give them additional training. Therefore, the United States could take a calculated risk in assuming that its forces in theater, combined with those of allies, could accomplish

⁵⁹ National Guard Bureau. Posture Statement as of 1 March 2000.

most of the missions, with the primary reinforcement coming from an Army National Guard Division of somewhat lower readiness.

In addition, it should be recalled in this regard that the National Guard Divisions will be the last units to receive the digital Force XXI upgrades. Since the POMCUS equipment is not planned to be upgraded, these forces will be trained and organized to operate the older equipment. This leaves the rest of the Army in CONUS and other locations prepared to execute missions in other regions of the world.

Currently the Army National Guard is reorganizing, but there will still be a minimum of five heavy divisions in the force structure. The responsibility to reinforce Europe would rotate among these heavy divisions. This means that a division would at the maximum get the mission only once every five years. This rotation plan, while giving these divisions an operational mission, prevents burnout of part-time personnel and units and eases employer concerns. With increased training and an opportunity to travel to Europe, it could also help in recruiting. In addition, this plan corresponds to the trends in peacekeeping in the Balkans. Currently the 49th Armored Division Headquarters is in Bosnia, with the 29th Infantry Division, 28th Infantry Division, and separate enhanced readiness brigades scheduled to go in the future. So the idea of rotating National Guard Divisions is already in place.

To increase the readiness of these divisions two important measures would be enacted. An active component training team would be assigned to the division eighteen months before assuming the mission and stay with the division until the mission was relinquished. Upon assuming responsibility for the mission, the division would deploy, in brigade combat teams, plus Corps CS/CSS packages, to Germany to conduct 30-day

(24 days in Europe, 3 days of mobilization/demobilization and travel each way) annual training. The division headquarters would also deploy to participate in the V Corps warfighter exercise. This would require the creation of more active component training teams, and money for three additional brigade rotations at the Combat Maneuver Training Center in Hohenfels, Germany.

To provide a formation for the German II Corps, the U.S. 10th Mountain Division would be assigned. Combined with the German 1st Mountain Division, the German II Corps would be able to dominate restrictive terrain in any European contingency.

E. RECOMMENDATION

Aside from monetary cost considerations, the most advantageous plan is the third one. This plan would vastly increase the capability of USAREUR and in turn enhance the stature of the United States within the NATO alliance. With this design, USAREUR should be able to accomplish any limited action without immediate reinforcement. This would allow forces in the United States to concentrate their planning and training on other theaters. The reserve component would be given a mission to focus its planning and training, and III Corps would be built up as the backbone of the United States Army until the fielding of the Army After Next. However, the complexity of this plan would require the movement of many units and the transformation of others. This would require a large sum of money. Indeed, it might cost so much to set up that it would delay or reduce the number of interim force brigades entering the force.

If further analysis determines that there is not enough money to implement this plan over the next five to seven years, the second plan should be enacted. Although the second plan would not offer as many advantages as the third, it comes close to doing so.

A reduction in the number of changes required by the plans may provide the necessary amount of funds to restructure USAREUR.

D. CONCLUSION

Throughout all the talk on transforming the U.S. Army, there has barely been a word concerning the transformation of USAREUR. This organization of 64,000 soldiers is a critical element of the national security strategy because it defines the ground force component of the American commitment to NATO in non-crisis situations and demonstrates the ability of the United States to conduct military operations on a global scale.

It has been nearly a decade since the last major review of the structure of USAREUR. In that time many important changes have occurred in the international security environment and in military technology. These developments necessitate changes in USAREUR to improve its ability to deploy and operate farther from its bases in Central Europe, while utilizing the new technology to become more effective in the conduct of operations.

If the United States Army continues on its present course, USAREUR will become the least capable of all its organizations and send the wrong signals to the NATO allies. By utilizing new organizations, technology, and concepts of operations, USAREUR will improve its capability, increase the capability of the Army as a whole, and allow the United States to remain the unquestioned leader of NATO.

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